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ABSTRACT 
In Part 1, we study the costs associated with firm illiquidity. We specifically examine the 
impact of illiquidity on the costs of financing, financial distress, underinvestment, and 
competitiveness in product markets. We focus on a comprehensive definition of liquidity that 
expands upon the typical measure of liquidity, cash and markeappendix securities, commonly 
used in the management literature.  Our liquidity index, derived from existing cash and 
markeappendix securities, available credit lines and cash volatility, measures the likelihood that a 
firm will become illiquid.  Lastly, we address the endogeneity issue that plagues corporate 
literature linking firm performance to other firm attributes using a well-developed dynamic panel 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator.  Our results indicate that illiquidity is 
associated with higher costs of financing, increased financial distress, and decreased competitive 
advantage.  In Part 2, we examine the extent that firms utilize lines of credit to fund cash 
dividends.  We find that higher dividend payouts are related to higher liquidity and dividend 
paying firms that experience cash shortages with utilize credit lines to continue dividend 
payments. Our sample statistics indicate that dividend paying firms are considerably different 
than non-payers. Dividend payers tend to be more liquid, despite having less cash, have smaller 
credit line balances, higher market capitalizations, less long-term debt, are more profiappendix, 
and spend less on capital investments.  One of our keying findings indicates that liquidity is an 
important determinant of dividend payouts. In Part 3, we study the determinants of liquidity for 
4,928 micro-firms surveyed by the Kauffman Foundation over the period 2004 – 2012. Female 
owned firms are more liquid, smaller, carry more inventories, and use less trade credit than male 
firms. White-owned firms are less liquid than Asian or African-American owned firms, while the 
Asian-owned are significantly larger than white- and African-American-owned, and the African-
American-owned have the least inventory and land holdings.  The most highly educated owners 
operated the largest firms, with the most equipment, and the least inventory and land. Firms with 
most experienced owners are the most liquid and largest. Additionally, we find that liquidity is 
negatively related to firm inventory levels and equipment holdings.  
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PART 1: COSTS OF ILLIQUIDITY 
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PART 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Managing liquidity has been an important issue to managers since Keynes (1936) argued 
that liquidity management and financial constraints are fundamentally linked. Keynes suggested 
that if financial markets were efficient, then firm liquidity decisions would be irrelevant. 
However, he argued that financial markets contain frictions, thus liquidity decisions are not 
irrelevant. Keynes assumed that firms are financially constrained and need liquidity to fund 
investment. Han and Qiu, (2007) suggest financially constrained firms cannot make future 
investments without reducing current investments because they have exhausted all external 
financing sources. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that asymmetric information will lead to 
financially constrained firms under investing in positive NPV projects. They propose that 
existing shareholders, bondholders, and other stakeholders are better off when firms’ carry 
sufficient financial slack (cash and cash equivalents) to fund good investment opportunities, 
since external financing is costly. In a survey of CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 
CFOs consider their decisions about corporate liquidity to be one the most important decisions 
that they make. CFOs view their primary job as finding ways to fund investment opportunities 
 3 
 
suggested/proposed by the CEO. Several other studies have suggested that liquidity is linked to 
cost of capital, financial distress, investment, and competitiveness
1
.     
 In his overview of the corporate cash holding literature, Denis (2011) indicates uncertain 
cash flows and unpredicappendix growth opportunities impact the liquidity of firms; however, 
several key issues remain unresolved.  He suggest the existing literature does not address to what 
extent is financial flexibility a first-order determinant of financial policies, what are the relative 
costs and benefits of alternative sources of financial flexibility, and what are the benefits of 
corporate payouts.  This study focuses on the relative costs of illiquidity using a comprehensive 
measure of financial flexibility.  Specifically, we examine the relation between illiquidity and the 
cost of financing, financial distress, underinvestment, and competitive advantage in the market 
place.  Using a sample of approximately 3,500 firms, our results indicate that illiquidity is related 
to a higher cost of capital, higher financial distress, and a competitive disadvantage in product 
markets.  
 We introduce a comprehensive measure of liquidity that combines cash and 
markeappendix securities as well as available credit lines.
2
  While a few recent studies [Sufi 
(2009), Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) and Kahle and Stulz (2013)] have expanded their 
definition of liquidity to include a firm’s credit lines, they did not use the expanded measure of 
                                                          
1 Myers & Majluf (1984), Minton & Schrand (1999), John (1993), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Wruck (2002), 
Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen (1988), Rauh (2006), Denis & Sibilkov (2010), Haushalter, Klasa, & Maxwell (2007), 
and Fresard (2010) 
2
 OPSW (1999), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2013) all focus on cash and cash equivalents. 
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liquidity to analyze the impact of liquidity management on specific firm outcomes.
3
  
 Previous studies have focused solely on cash and cash equivalents. Almeida, et al. (2013) 
conclude that the predominate use of cash and cash equivalents in existing studies has clouded 
their findings and more comprehensive measures of liquidity should be used in future research. 
Our liquidity measure is an index based on Emery and Cogger’s (1982) lambda4. Our liquidity 
index, logLIQi,t, is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available credit divided by cash 
volatility, where cash volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of cash and cash equivalents. 
The benefit of this index is it is more effective at assessing solvency since a lower (higher) 
measure indicates that a firm is more (less) likely to become insolvent (Emery, 1984).   
We address the well documented issues of endogeneity using a dynamic panel 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Using a similar methodology, Wintoki, 
Linck, and Netter (2012) analyze the dynamic relation between board governance and firm 
performance.  Using this methodology reduces endogeneity concerns in corporate governance 
research. 
  
                                                          
3
 Sufi (2009), Lins, Servaies and Tufano (2010),  Kahle and Stulz (2013),  Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013)   
4
 Emery and Cogger’s lambda is computed as the sum of daily cash & equivalents, available credit lines, and 
expected cash flow divided by daily standard deviation of cash. Using daily data their lambda can be interpreted as a 
Z-score that indicates the probability of being illiquid.  
 5 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 The existing liquidity management literature focuses on three primary areas, including 
the determinants of cash holdings, the cash flow sensitivity of cash, and the value of cash.   The 
determinants of liquidity literature includes work by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(1999), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), Subramaniam, et al. (2011), and Ang and Smedema 
(2011), among others
5
.  Opler et al examine the level of cash holdings for a large sample of 
publicly-traded U.S. firms and find that firms with more growth opportunities and riskier cash 
flows maintain higher liquidity positions, while firms with better access to capital markets have 
lower liquidity positions. These findings support the implications of Keynes’ arguments for 
liquidity.  Opler et al indicate a target level of cash exists and that it varies with the value of the 
firm’s investments and financial constraints.  Bates, et al find that increases in firm cash holdings 
are partially explained by increased cash flow volatility and decreased research and development 
spending, which is consistent with Keynes’ precautionary motive for holding cash. 
Subramaniam, et al. find the non-diversified firms tend to have larger cash balances, while Ang 
and Smedema find evidence that less financially constrained firms build their cash balance ahead 
of recessions.   
The cash flow sensitivity of cash literature includes studies by Almeida, Campello, and 
Weisbach (2004), Kusnadi and Wei (2011) and Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2013). The cash flow 
sensitivity of cash is the marginal propensity to save cash from incremental cash flows.  Almeida 
                                                          
5
 Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & Twite (2007) examine the relation between repatriation taxes and the quantity of cash 
holdings; Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson (2013) examine cash holdings since the Financial Crisis of 2008-09.  
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et al find the estimated cash flow sensitivity of cash is significantly positive for financially 
constrained firms and statistically insignificant for unconstrained firms. In a global study of cash 
flow sensitivity to cash, Kusnadi and Wei find that financially constrained firms exhibit a higher 
cash flow sensitivity of cash only in firms from countries with weak legal protection of investors. 
Erel et al examine if the cash flow sensitivity of cash impacts whether small, European merger 
targets were constrained prior to being acquired and if the constraints were relieved by the 
acquisition.    
A third stream of liquidity management literature focuses on the market value of cash. 
Both Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2006) estimate the market 
value of firm’s cash by regressing excess market returns (proxy for market value of firm) on cash 
holdings. Both studies find that the marginal value of cash is higher for financially constrained 
firms than for unconstrained firms. Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) verify these 
findings using international data from 35 countries.  Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that higher 
cash holdings are associated with greater investment for constrained firms and that investment is 
more positively associated with value in constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms.  
 A few recent studies have emphasized the importance of credit lines as part of a firm’s 
overall liquidity. Sufi (2009), using a sample of 300 COMPUSTAT firms, finds that without 
credit lines have greater cash flow sensitivity. Lins, Servaies and Tufano (2010) survey CFOs 
from 29 countries and find that managers use cash as a way to hedge against negative cash flow 
shocks, while credit lines are used to enhance their firm’s ability to exploit future business 
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opportunities.  Kahle and Stulz (2013) use the Sufi approach to construct a random sample of 
300 firms as of the second quarter of 2007 to examine the importance of credit line drawdowns 
during the recent financial crisis.  Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013) provides theoretical 
predictions that the most efficient allocation of liquidity is one in which the firms with 
idiosyncratic liquidity risk use credit lines, while firms with liquidity risks that is highly 
correlated with aggregate liquidity shocks use cash in addition to credit lines. The importance of 
credit lines as part of a firm’s liquidity motivates this study.     
Several of the preceding studies indicate that holding more liquid assets for financially 
constrained firms is a value-enhancing response to costly external financing. Our study brings 
together elements from these streams of literature.  We develop four hypotheses that link firm 
outcomes to the liquidity index, our measure of liquidity that includes cash, cash equivalents, as 
well as credit lines.   
Endogeneity is a major concern for most corporate studies. To help mitigate the impact of 
endogeneity and reduce bias, for robustness we apply a well-developed dynamic panel 
generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology (Arrellano & Bond, 1991). We follow 
procedures for implementing a dynamic panel model recommended by Wintoki, Linck, and 
Netter (2012). Wintoki et al. (2012) uses a dynamic panel model to analyze the dynamics of 
internal corporate governance with specific instructions on implementing the methodology.  
Our first hypothesis arises from the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
that suggests external financing is more costly than internal funds. Minton and Schrand (1999) 
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shows that higher cash flow volatility (a component of liquidity) is associated with an increased 
likelihood that a firm will need to access external capital markets at higher costs. Since illiquid 
firms are more likely to require external financing, we hypothesize that illiquidity is negatively 
related to higher cost of external financing.   
H1: Costs of financing is negatively related to liquidity  
John (1993) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002) indicate that appropriate 
liquidity management can alleviate financial distress, while poor liquidity management may lead 
to financial distress costs. These costs include, but are not limited to, distressed asset sales and 
loss of going concern in liquidation (i.e. bankruptcy), thus we hypothesize that illiquidity may 
lead to financial distress.   
H2: Financial distress is negatively related to liquidity 
Myers and Majluf (1984), Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Minton and Schrand 
(1999) and Rauh (2006) theorize poor liquidity management leads to underinvestment by firms. 
More recently, Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that cash holdings are positively associated with 
net investment for financially constrained firms; therefore, we hypothesize that illiquidity leads 
to underinvestment.  
H3: Investment is positively related to liquidity 
Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) and Fresard (2010) document that liquidity 
management and product market behavior interacts. Fresard (2010) find that firms with more 
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cash tend to gain market share. Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) show that product market 
considerations influence cash management and hedging policies since the risk of predation 
encourages firms to save and hedge with derivatives. These papers suggest that illiquidity will 
adversely affect the competitive advantage of a firm, providing the rationale for our fourth and 
final hypothesis.  
H4: Competitive advantage is positively related to liquidity 
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DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 The initial sample includes all Compustat firms, excluding financial service and utility 
firms. The computation of our liquidity index requires detailed credit line data that is obtained 
from Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ (S & P) database. Capital IQ data includes information on 
bond issuances, long-term fixed-rate obligations, variable-rate obligations, commercial paper, 
credit facilities, and other obligations.  Specifically we focus on the line of credit data from 
Capital IQ that is available for the past 12 years (2002 – 2013) for COMPUSTAT firms. Other 
firm characteristics are collected from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  Additionally, interest rate and 
market returns data were obtained from Ken French’s website.6 The final sample consists of an 
unbalanced panel of approximately 24,000 firm-year observations for over 3500 firms.
7
  
Appendix 1 provides definitions of key variables.  
 Appendix 2 presents descriptive statistics of our sample. The average firm in our sample 
has just over $5 billion in assets, $540 million in cash, and a liquidity index of 2.224. Panels A-D 
in Appendix 3 presents Spearman correlations between the various dependent variables, liquidity 
variables, and control variables.   None of the correlations indicate multicollinearity concerns. 
Equation (1) tests H1: cost of financing is negatively related and the liquidity index.  
                                                          
6
 Ken French graciously provides data on the book-to-market and size portfolio breakpoints and returns 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). 
7
 The number of firm-years and firms varies for each model since some of the dependent variables require lags 
and/or have missing values.  
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𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑜 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝐴_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐷_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,                                                                                                                               (1) 
where WACCi,t is the firm cost of capital financing for period t, logLIQi,t  is the sum of cash, cash 
equivalents, and available credit divided by cash volatility, where cash volatility is the quarterly 
standard deviation of cash and cash equivalents. logMCAPi,t is firm market capitalization  and 
logBMi,t  is book-to market control for firm size. BLEVi,t  is book leverage and DIVDUMi,t  is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that pay dividends control for financial policies. OROEi,t  is 
operating return on equity computed by dividing earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) by 
equity controls for profitability.  FA_TAi,t  is fixed assets-to-total assets and RD_TAi,t is research 
and development expenditures-to-total assets control for investment policies.  Control variables 
are based on the findings of Opler et al (1999), and are used in a recent study on the cost of 
capital by Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014).    
 WACCi,t is the weighted average cost of debt and equity. To calculate the weights 
of debt and equity, we use the book value of long-term debt plus long term lease obligations 
added to the market value of equity as the denominator. The cost of debt is estimated as actual 
interest expense divided by long-term debt and leases. The cost of equity is estimated using the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach with rolling betas estimated from monthly stock returns for the 
preceding three years. Equation (1) isolates the relation between liquidity and the cost of capital 
while controlling for firm size, financial policy, earnings, investment policy, and dividend 
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policy.  It also includes fixed effects for time and industry (Fama and French, 1997). We expect a 
negative relation between logLIQi,t and WACCi,t.  
Equation (2) tests H2: financial distress is negatively related to liquidity.  
𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑍𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐹𝐴_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑅𝐷_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ,                    (2) 
where ALTZi,t is our modified Altman (1968) Z-score, logLIQi,t  and the control variables 
are defined above. Financial distress is measured with a modified Altman (1968) Z-score
8
. The 
basic Altman Z-score is based on five financial ratios, including working capital to total assets, 
retained earnings to total assets, earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, market value of 
equity to total liabilities, and sales to total assets. Our modified Altman Z-score equation: 
𝑍 = 1.2 (
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙−𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) + 1.4 (
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) + 3.3 (
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) +
0.6 (
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
) + 0.99 (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)        (3) 
Firms with a lower score would be more prone to experience financial distress. To decrease 
potential collinearity issues, our modified Altman Z uses net assets instead of total assets, where 
net assets equal total assets minus cash and markeappendix securities.  Cash and markeappendix 
securities are also removed from net working capital. In a 1998 study on the determinants of 
corporate liquidity, Kim, Mauer, and Sherman measure financial distress using a modified 
                                                          
8
 Altman Z-score (1978) formula: Z=1.2(working capital-to-total assets)+1.4(retained earnings-to-total 
assets)+3.3(EBIT-to-total assets)+0.6(market value of equity-to-book value of total liabilities)+0.99(Sales-to-total 
assets) 
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Altman's Z-score that excludes the net working capital term.  Equation (2) isolates the relation 
between liquidity and financial distress controlling for firm size, financial policy, earnings, 
investment policy, and dividend policy. It includes fixed effects for time and industry (Fama and 
French, 1997). We expect a positive relation between logLIQi,t and ALTZi,t. 
Equation (3) tests H3: investment is positively related to liquidity.  
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  (𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛾𝑜 +  𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾5𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  (𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾8𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,                                                                               (4) 
where CAPX_TAi,t is capital expenditures-to-net assets, RD_TAi,t is research and 
development expenditures-to-total assets,  logLIQi,t, and the control variables are defined above.  
CAPX_TAi,t and RD_TAi,t are proxies for underinvestment. Equation (4) isolates the relation 
between liquidity and underinvestment controlling for firm size, financial policy, earnings, 
investment policy, and dividend policy.  We also include fixed effects for time and industry 
(Fama and French, 1997). We expect a positive relation between logLIQi,t  and CAPX_TAi,,t. 
Equation (4) tests H4: competitive advantage is positively related to liquidity.  
 𝑀𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛿𝑜 + 𝜹𝟏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛿6𝐹𝐴_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑅𝐷_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿8𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡.           (5) 
where MSHAREi,t is the firm’s share of the industry revenues, logLIQi,t  and the control 
variables are defined above.  Firm competitiveness is primarily proxied by firm market share 
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(MSHARE)
9
. Industry designations are based on Fama & French (1997) industry definitions.   
Alternate proxies, annual revenue growth (REV_Gi,t) and profitability (OROAi,t) are also 
examined.  Equation (5) isolates the relation between liquidity and competitiveness controlling 
for firm size, financial policy, earnings, investment policy, and dividend policy.  We also 
includes fixed effects for time and industry (Fama and French, 1997). We expect a positive 
relation between logLIQi,t  and MSHAREi,,t.. 
 We also use an alternative, and more traditional measure of liquidity: cash & 
markeappendix securities-to-net assets (CASH_TAi,t) in our tests.  Spearmen correlations and the 
multivariate models suggest that our liquidity index, logLIQi,t, and CASH_TAi,t are measuring 
different aspects of firm liquidity. Three of the Spearmen correlations between logLIQi,t and 
CASH_TAi,t  found in Appendix 3 (Panels B, C, & D) are a statistically significant -0.21. This is a 
strong indication that our measure is a different measure of liquidity than used in previous 
studies. The negative relation potentially arises from the negative relation between cash 
volatility, the denominator of our liquidity index, and the level of cash.
10
 Another possible 
explanation is the potential substitution effect between cash and credit lines that is captured by 
our liquidity index, but not CASH_TAi,t. Multi-variate results indicate that logLIQi,t and 
CASH_TAi,t capture different aspects of firm liquidity.  
                                                          
9
 Irvine & Pontiff (2009) uses market share as a proxy for firm competitiveness. 
10
 Han & Qiu (2007) show that financially constrained firms increase their cash holdings in response to cash flow 
volatility. 
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 Corporate finance models that link firm performance/outcomes to other firm variables are 
often subject to endogeneity. We need to determine if the observed relations are driven by 
liquidity or if the variables influence firms’ liquidity positions, all while controlling for other 
possible determinants. To help mitigate the impact of endogeneity and reduce bias, we apply a 
well-developed dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology. (Arrellano 
& Bond, 1991) This method obtains consistent parameter estimates by using instruments that 
come from the orthogonality conditions existing between the lagged values of the endogenous 
variables and the disturbance terms. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 In Appendix 4 we relate the various dependent variables to our liquidity index using 
univariate tests.  We sort the total sample into quintiles (deciles) based on the liquidity index, 
where Q1 denotes lowest liquidity and Q5 (Q10) denotes highest liquidity quintile (decile).  
Most of the differences are significant, providing initial support for our hypotheses that liquidity 
is related to a firm’s cost of capital, financial distress, underinvestment and competitiveness.   
Figure 1 shows the average level of outcome/performance by liquidity index quintile. The graphs 
provide a clear picture of the difference in firm performance at the different levels of liquidity, 
especially between quintiles 1 and 5.    
 The Q1-Q5 spread for WACC is an economically significant -1.127% indicating that 
illiquid firms payer have a higher cost of capital. The Altman Z-score is almost five times lower 
for firms in Q1 relative to Q5 which suggest that our liquidity index is strongly related to 
financial distress. Capital expenditures and research & development expenditures are higher for 
the least liquid firms suggesting that these firms spend a larger percentage of their net assets on 
these expenditures resulting in lower liquidity. This does not support our hypothesis that illiquid 
firms underinvest.  Market share and profits are significantly larger for more liquid firms. Q5 
firms’ market share (profits) are 6.627 (24.587) percentage points higher than Q1 firms. This 
supports the hypothesis that illiquid firms have a competitive disadvantage relative to more 
liquid firms.  Multivariate Analysis 
 17 
 
  Multivariate analysis provides additional evidence of the relation between illiquidity and 
various firm characteristics
11
.  Appendix 5 provides support for our first hypothesis that the cost 
of capital is higher for illiquid firms holding other factors constant. This result implies illiquid 
firms will require more costly external funds providing support for Myers and Majluf’s (1984) 
pecking order theory. LogLIQi,t, is negative and significant supporting using our alternative 
measure of liquidity. We find the traditional measure of liquidity (CASH_TAi,t) is positively 
significant. This difference is potentially explained by previous findings that indicate financially 
constrained firms tend to hold more cash.  Additionally, firms with higher book-to-market, more 
financial leverage, more fixed assets, and that pay dividends experience lower capital costs 
(WACCi,t).  
 Appendix 6 displays results supporting for the hypothesis that poor liquidity management 
leads to financial distress cost as indicated by John (1993) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck 
(2002).  LogLIQi,t is positive and significant at the 5% level and the significantly positive 
coefficient of CASH_TAi,t reinforces the hypothesis that illiquid firms have more financial 
distress. The results in this appendix also indicate that smaller and less profiappendix firms are 
more financially distressed, while less financially distressed firms spend more on research and 
development and pay dividends.   
 
                                                          
11
 All regressions are run using pooled OLS with standard errors that are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-
level clustering. 
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 Appendix 7 tests our third hypothesis that capital expenditures are positively related to 
liquidity. Interestingly our results indicate capital expenditures are not significantly related to our 
measure of liquidity; however, R & D expenditures are negative and significantly related to 
liquidity. More liquid firms are spending a smaller percentage of net assets on research and 
development.  Thus we reject the hypothesis of a positive relation between liquidity and 
investment, but we cannot conclude that liquidity is unrelated to investment. Capital 
expenditures are inversely related to size and dividend payouts and directly related to fixed 
assets. Research and development spending is negatively related to size, profitability, and fixed 
assets and positively related to leverage and capital expenditures.  
 Appendix 8 reports results for hypothesis four that a firm’s competitive advantage is 
negatively related to liquidity. Our results are consistent with Fresard (2010) who finds that firms 
with more cash tend to gain market share.  Market share is not significantly related to the 
liquidity index; however, revenue growth is negatively related and profitability is positively 
related.  These results support that lower liquidity firms correspond with higher revenue growth 
which is consistent with the fact that high growth firms tend to have liquidity issues.  The 
positive relation between profits and liquidity confirms the univariate results that illiquid firms 
are the least profiappendix firms.   Market share is positively related to size and leverage, but 
negatively related to fixed asset levels and dividend payouts. Revenue growth is negatively 
related to size and positively related to fixed asset levels, research and development spending, 
and dividend payouts. Profitability is positively related to size and dividend payouts, but 
negatively related to fixed asset levels.   
 19 
 
 Finally we present our analysis using a dynamic panel GMM estimator.  Previous 
research by Glen, Lee, and Singh (2001), Gschwandtner (2005) and, Wintoki, et. al. (2012) 
suggests that two lags are sufficient to ensure dynamic completeness, thus we use two lags
12
 of 
our dependent variables and potential endogenous independent variables.  Results from this 
methodology strengthen our above findings for the relation between capital expenditures, market 
share, profitability and liquidity. However no relation is found between cost of capital or 
financial distress and liquidity. Liquidity has a positively significant impact on capital 
expenditures, market share, and profitability.   
 
  
                                                          
12
 Similar results were produced with lag periods of 1 & 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
 We examine the impact of illiquidity on cost of financing, financial distress, 
underinvestment, and competitive advantage in the product markets. An important contribution 
of this study is that our liquidity index is a more comprehensive liquidity measure than used in 
previous studies. Our measure more effectively assesses long-term solvency since a lower 
(higher) index indicates that a firm is more (less) likely to become insolvent. 
 We hypothesize that illiquidity is related to a higher cost of capital, higher financial 
distress, underinvestment, and a competitive disadvantage in the product markets. Our univariate 
results provide support all our hypotheses, except the relation between liquidity and 
underinvestment. The multivariate results strengthen our conclusions by confirming the relation 
between our liquidity index and cost of capital, financial distress, and competitive advantage 
while controlling for other firm characteristics, time, and industry effects.  These results are 
supported by dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimates that control for potential 
endogeneity issues using lags of the dependent variable of interest and potentially endogenous 
control variables.    
 Our results indicate that firm illiquidity has negative economic consequences that 
managers should consider when determining liquidity management policies. Typically managers 
focus on minimizing their liquid holdings, which may be fine if the firm has available credit 
lines, but if not, they need to at least consider the costs of illiquidity.  
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APPENDIX 1: DEFINITION OF KEY VARIABLES 
 28 
 
 
Variable Definition 
logLIQ The natural log of the liquidity index; Liquidity index is the sum of cash & 
market securities (CHE) and available line of credit divided by volatility of 
cash. 
TA Net assets is total assets minus cash & markeappendix securities: (AT – 
CHE) 
CASH_TA Cash & markeappendix securities (CHE) scaled by net assets (TA) 
WACC The weighted average cost of debt and equity. The denominator for  the 
weights are the book value of long-term debt plus long term lease 
obligations added to the market value of equity, with the weight of debt 
computed as the fraction of the total from debt and the weight of equity is 
the fraction of the total from equity. The cost of debt is estimated as interest 
expense divided by long-term debt and leases. The cost of equity is 
estimated using CAPM. 
ALTZ The Altman Z-score is based on five financial ratios, including working 
capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets, market value of equity to total liabilities, 
and sales to total assets. To decrease potential collinearity issues, our 
modified Altman Z uses net assets. Cash and markeappendix securities is 
removed from net working capital.  
DIFDVC_NETAT The change in dividends (DVC) scaled by net assets (TA) 
CAPX_TA Capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by net assets (TA) 
RD_TA Research and development (XRD) expenditures scaled by net assets (TA) 
MSHARE Firm market share: (Percent of industry revenues) 
REV_G The logarithm of the growth rate of annual revenues (REVT) 
OROA Operating return on assets: EBIT (EBIT) divided by net assets (TA) 
logMCAP The logarithm of firm market capitalization: (CSHPRI*PRCC_F) 
logBM The logarithm of the book-to-market ratio: [(BKVLPS*CSHO)/MCAP] 
BLEV Book leverage (DLTT) scaled by net assets (TA) 
OROE Operating return on book equity: EBIT divided by equity (EBIT/CEQ) 
FA_TA Fixed assets (AT-ACT) scaled by net assets (TA) 
DIVDUM A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. 
Appendix I. Definition of Key Variables 
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APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 30 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 5
th
 % Median 95
th
 % Max 
logLIQ 2.224 1.250 -0.693 0.398 2.120 4.355 12.398 
CASH_TA 154.937 4355.50 0 0.541 13.062 216.344 463990.000 
WACC (%)* 13.800 12.086 0.003 0.448 10.011 39.189 49.997 
ALTZ -3.013 215.605 -36795.890 -18.343 2.964 13.194 4723.760 
DIVDIF -0.013 2.436 -438.840 -0.003 0 0.014 28.714 
CAPX_TA (%) 7.117 10.918 -33.937 0.543 4.229 23.383 1245.080 
RD_TA (%) 37.518 287.127 -87.965 0 4.322 133.662 36111.430 
MSHARE (%) 10.678 21.088 -0.055 0.005 1.433 61.210 100.000 
OROA -10.556 1128.09 -234800.000 -51.530 5.920 21.505 878.544 
REV_G 2.928 2.427 -7.851 0.261 2.650 6.327 18.378 
logMCAP 19.112 4.121 -2.952 7.940 19.821 23.760 27.059 
lobBM -0.748 0.946 -8.993 -2.240 -0.708 0.620 12.211 
BLEV 28.167 282.048 0.000 0.000 15.327 74.601 57054.030 
FA_TA 62.728 23.025 0 20.488 65.210 94.887 100.000 
OROE -125575.000 3268.960 -125575.000 -96.386 13.538 74.543 551925.000 
DIVDUM 0.317 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Appendix 2 reports summary statistics for the measures of the liquidity, weighted average cost of capital, Altman Z-score, 
dividend change, capital expenditures, research and development expenditures, firm market share, operating return on assets, and 
revenue growth rates, and the control variables. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of 
cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); CASH_TA is cash & cash equivalents scaled by net 
assets, net assets is total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; WACC is the weighted average cost of capital; ALTZ is the Altman 
(1968) Z-score of financial distress; DIVDIF is the annual dividend change; CAPX_TA is capital expenditures scaled by net 
assets; RD_TA is research and development expenses scaled by net assets; MSHARE is firm’s market share, calculated as 
percentage of industry revenues; OROA is operating return on assets, which is earnings before interest and taxes divided by net 
assets; REV_G is annual growth rate of sales; logMCAP is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of 
the book-to-market equity ratio; BLEV is book leverage; FA_TA is fixed assets scaled by net assets; OROE is operating return on 
equity, which earnings before and interest and taxes divided by firm equity; DIVDUM is a dummy variable equal to one if firm 
pays dividends, and 0 otherwise.  
*Trimmed (Removed negative values and values above 95
th
 percentile) 
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APPENDIX 3: SPEARMEN CORRELATIONS 
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Panel A. Correlations between WACC, liquidity measures, and control variables. 
 WACC LogLIQ CASH_TA LogMCAP LogBM BLEV OROA OROE FA_TA RD_TA DIVDUM 
WACC 1.0           
LogLIQ -0.022 1.0          
CASH_TA 0.157 -0.316 1.0         
LogMCAP 0.096 0.186 0.006 1.0        
LogBM -0.094 0.095 -0.219 -0.334 1.0       
BLEV -0.142 -0.029 -0.132 0.066 -0.086 1.0      
OROA -0.43 0.201 -0.137 0.462 -0.307 -0.063 1.0     
OROE -0.076 0.125 -0.163 0.366 -0.341 0.140 0.696 1.0    
FA_TA -0.061 -0.042 -0.150 0.235 -0.021 0.341 -0.039 -0.012 1.0   
RD_TA 0.135 -0.206 0.571 -0.075 -0.249 -0.031 -0.364 -0.296 -0.021 1.0  
DIVDUM -0.045 0.197 -0.167 0.466 -0.059 -0.008 0.353 0.294 0.094 -0.248 1.0 
*Bold and italicized values are significant at the 1.0% and 5.0% level, respectively, otherwise not significantly different than zero.   
 
Panel B. Correlations between ALTZ, liquidity measures, and control variables. 
 ALTZ LogLIQ CASH_TA LogMCAP LogBM BLEV OROA OROE FA_TA RD_TA DIVDUM 
ALTZ 1.0           
LogLIQ 0.169 1.0          
CASH_TA 0.131 -0.209 1.0         
LogMCAP 0.297 0.257 -0.049 1.0        
LogBM -0.224 0.090 -0.229 -0.319 1.0       
BLEV -0.373 0.040 -0.319 0.166 -0.024 1.0      
OROA 0.584 0.225 -0.198 0.467 -0.254 0.038 1.0     
OROE 0.285 0.137 -0.237 0.362 -0.261 0.189 0.698 1.0    
FA_TA -0.239 -0.034 -0.195 0.225 -0.021 0.353 -0.027 0.004 1.0   
RD_TA -0.221 -0.189 0.643 -0.203 -0.249 -0.187 -0.446 -0.349 -0.119 1.0  
DIVDUM 0.201 0.207 -0.221 0.422 -0.045 0.099 0.372 0.320 0.094 -0.304 1.0 
*Bold and italicized values are significant at the 1.0% and 5.0% level, respectively, otherwise not significantly different than zero.   
 
Panel C. Correlations between capital expenditures, research and development expenditures, liquidity measures, and control variables 
 CAPX_TA RD_TA LogLIQ CASH_TA LogMCAP LogBM BLEV OROA OROE FA_TA DIVDUM 
CAPX_TA 1.0           
RD_TA -0.015 1.0          
LogLIQ 0.013 -0.189 1.0         
CASH_TA 0.075 0.643 -0.209 1.0        
LogMCAP 0.142 -0.203 0.257 -0.049 1.0       
LogBM -0.149 -0.249 0.090 -0.229 -0.319 1.0      
BLEV 0.036 -0.187 0.040 -0.319 0.166 -0.024 1.0     
OROA 0.094 -0.446 0.225 -0.198 0.467 -0.254 0.038 1.0    
OROE 0.040 -0.349 0.137 -0.237 0.362 -0.261 0.189 0.698 1.0   
FA_TA 0.219 -0.119 -0.034 -0.195 0.225 -0.021 0.353 -0.027 0.004 1.0  
DIVDUM 0.057 -0.304 0.207 -0.221 0.422 -0.045 0.099 0.372 0.320 0.094 1.0 
*Bold and italicized values are significant at the 1.0% and 5.0% level, respectively, otherwise not significantly different than zero.   
 
Panel D. Correlations between market share, profitability, liquidity measures, and control variables 
 MSHARE OROA LogLIQ CASH_TA LogMCAP LogBM BLEV OROE FA_TA RD_TA DIVDUM 
MSHARE 1.0           
OROA 0.457 1.0          
LogLIQ 0.253 0.225 1.0         
CASH_TA -0.348 -0.198 -0.209 1.0        
LogMCAP 0.489 0.467 0.257 -0.049 1.0       
 33 
 
LogBM 0.039 -0.253 0.090 -0.229 -0.319 1.0      
BLEV 0.209 0.038 0.040 -0.319 0.166 -0.024 1.0     
OROE 0.376 0.698 0.137 -0.237 0.362 -0.261 0.189 1.0    
FA_TA -0.036 -0.027 -0.034 -0.195 0.225 -.021 0.353 0.004 1.0   
RD_TA -0.538 -0.446 -0.189 -0.643 -0.203 -0.249 -0.187 -0.349 -0.119 1.0  
DIVDUM 0.412 0.372 0.207 -0.221 0.422 -0.045 0.099 0.320 0.094 -0.304 1.0 
*Bold and italicized values are significant at the 1.0% and 5.0% level, respectively, otherwise not significantly different than zero.   
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APPENDIX 4: UNIVARIATE TESTS OF ILLQUIDITY 
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  Liquidity Quintile Liquidity Decile 
 Variable Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 p-value Q1 Q10 Q10-Q1 p-value 
H1 WACC 13.884 12.757 -1.127 0.000 13.654 12.338 -1.316 0.000 
H2 
ALTZ -23.365 5.883 29.248 0.000 -38.671 8.668 47.339 0.000 
DIVDIF -0.042 -0.000 -0.042 0.115 -0.088 0.001 0.089 0.000 
H3 
CAPX_TA 8.563 6.728 -1.835 0.000 9.150 6.944 -2.206 0.000 
RD_TA 87.737 9.067 -78.670 0.000 105.652 6.558 -99.094 0.000 
H4 
MSHARE 6.791 13.418 6.627 0.000 6.078 14.025 7.947 0.000 
REV_G 3.874 2.476 -1.398 0.000 4.356 2.456 -1.900 0.000 
OROA -17.221 7.366 24.587 0.000 -30.556 7.183 37.739 0.000 
Appendix 4 reports the average weighted average cost of capital, Altman Z-score, dividend change, capital expenditure, 
research and development expenditure, market share, revenue growth rate, and operating return on assets by liquidity quintile 
and decile. The p-value columns report the p-value corresponding to the test of the difference in means between Q1 and Q5 
and Q1 and Q10. WACC is the weighted average cost of capital; ALTZ is the Altman (1968) Z-score of financial distress; 
DIVDIF is the annual dividend change; CAPX_TA is capital expenditures scaled by net assets; RD_TA is research and 
development expenses scaled by net assets; MSHARE is firm’s market share, calculated as percentage of industry revenues; 
OROA is operating return on assets, which is earnings before interest and taxes divided by net assets; REV_G is annual 
growth rate of sales. 
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Independent Variables 
1 
(WACC) 
2 
(WACC) 
3 
(WACC) 
4 
(WACC) 
logLIQ -0.419*** -0.419***   
 [0.000] [0.000]   
CASH_TA   0.412*** 0.412*** 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
logMCAP 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.155** 0.155*** 
 [0.006] [0.000] [0.017] [0.001] 
logBM -0.885*** -0.885*** -0.948*** -0.948*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
BLEV -0.924*** -0.924*** -1.594*** -1.594*** 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
OROE -0.035 -0.035 -0.038 -0.038 
 [0.292] [0.290] [0.262] [0.260] 
FA_TA -1.569** -1.569*** -0.989 -0.989* 
 [0.022] [0.003] [0.151] [0.060] 
RD_TA 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.792] [0.743] [0.545] [0.564] 
DIVDUM -2.482*** -2.482*** -2.572*** -2.572*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CONSTANT 5.906*** 5.906*** 5.422*** 5.422*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Observations 12,428 12,428 12,428 12,428 
R-squared 0.538 0.538 0.540 0.540 
Firm Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Appendix 5 presents the fixed effects regressions estimating the relation between cost of capital and liquidity for a sample of 
publicly-traded firms. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and 
available line of credit divided by cash volatility); CASH_TA is cash & cash equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets 
minus cash & cash equivalents; logMCAP is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-
market equity ratio; BLEV is book leverage; OROE is operating return on equity, which earnings before and interest and taxes 
divided by firm equity; FA_TA is fixed assets scaled by net assets; RD_TA is research and development expenses scaled by net 
assets; DIVDUM is a dummy variable equal to one if firm pays dividends, and 0 otherwise. All models include dummies for time 
and industry affiliation (Fama-French, 1997). Unreported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the 
firm level. P-values appear in brackets. For brevity, the annual time dummies and industry dummies are not presented.  *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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Independent Variables 
1 
(ALT-Z) 
2 
(ALT-Z) 
3 
(ALT-Z) 
4 
(ALT-Z) 
logLIQ 0.601** 0.601**   
 [0.024] [0.018]   
CASH_TA   0.007* 0.007* 
   [0.055] [0.085] 
logMCAP 2.679*** 2.679*** 2.680*** 2.680*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
logBM -1.271 -1.271 -1.255 -1.255 
 [0.399] [0.308] [0.409] [0.319] 
BLEV -0.347 -0.347* -0.355 -0.355* 
 [0.156] [0.055] [0.147] [0.050] 
OROE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] 
FA_TA 0.104 0.104 0.120 0.120* 
 [0.255] [0.129] [0.197] [0.075] 
RD_TA -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.106*** -0.106*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
DIVDUM -4.621*** -4.621*** -4.168** -4.168*** 
 [0.009] [0.000] [0.017] [0.000] 
CONSTANT -7.285 -7.285 -14.212** -14.212*** 
 [0.555] [0.543] [0.021] [0.006] 
Observations 24,684 24,684 24,684 24,684 
R-squared 0.302 0.302 0.308 0.308 
Firm Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Appendix 6 presents the fixed effects regressions estimating the relation between the Altman Z-score and liquidity for a sample of 
publicly-traded firms. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and 
available line of credit divided by cash volatility); CASH_TA is cash & cash equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets 
minus cash & cash equivalents; logMCAP is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-
market equity ratio; BLEV is book leverage; OROE is operating return on equity, which earnings before and interest and taxes 
divided by firm equity; FA_TA is fixed assets scaled by net assets; RD_TA is research and development expenses scaled by net 
assets; DIVDUM is a dummy variable equal to one if firm pays dividends, and 0 otherwise. All models include dummies for time 
and industry affiliation (Fama-French, 1997). Unreported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the 
firm level. P-values appear in brackets. For brevity, the annual time dummies and industry dummies are not presented.  *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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Independent 
Variables 
1 
(CAPX_TA) 
2 
(CAPX_TA) 
3 
(CAPX_TA) 
4 
(CAPX_TA) 
5 
(RD_TA) 
6 
(RD_TA) 
7 
(RD_TA) 
8 
(RD_TA) 
logLIQ -0.018 -0.018   -6.942*** -6.942***   
 [0.772] [0.657]   [0.001] [0.001]   
CASH_TA   0.000 0.000   0.161 0.161 
   [0.242] [0.237]   [0.203] [0.203] 
logMCAP -0.049 -0.049* -0.054 -0.054** -5.503*** -5.503*** -6.188*** -6.188*** 
 [0.270] [0.063] [0.236] [0.047] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
logBM -1.139*** -1.139*** -1.147*** -1.147*** -4.518* -4.518** -7.706*** -7.706*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.052] [0.035] [0.000] [0.000] 
BLEV 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.429 0.429 
 [0.934] [0.924] [0.931] [0.922] [0.000] [0.000] [0.208] [0.222] 
OROE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 [0.829] [0.824] [0.854] [0.850] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
FA_TA 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.049*** -0.895*** -0.895*** -0.253 -0.253 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.364] [0.359] 
RD_TA 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001     
 [0.113] [0.111] [0.255] [0.253]     
CAPX_TA     2.785*** 2.785*** 1.603* 1.603* 
     [0.000] [0.000] [0.058] [0.055] 
DIVDUM -1.378*** -1.378*** -1.371*** -1.371*** 2.196 2.196 5.727* 5.727* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.332] [0.155] [0.087] [0.069] 
CONSTANT 5.476*** 5.476*** 5.147*** 5.147*** 69.901*** 69.901*** -112.489 -112.489 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.323] [0.301] 
Observations 24,713 24,713 24,713 24,713 24,713 24,713 24,713 24,713 
R-squared 0.124 0.124 0.125 0.125 0.077 0.077 0.299 0.299 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Time 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Appendix 7 presents the fixed effects regressions estimating the relation between the capital expenditures, research and 
development expenditures and liquidity for a sample of publicly-traded firms. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the 
liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); CASH_TA is cash & 
cash equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; logMCAP is the logarithm of firm 
market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; BLEV is book leverage; OROE is operating 
return on equity, which earnings before and interest and taxes divided by firm equity; FA_TA is fixed assets scaled by net assets; 
RD_TA is research and development expenses scaled by net assets; DIVDUM is a dummy variable equal to one if firm pays 
dividends, and 0 otherwise. All models include dummies for time and industry affiliation (Fama-French, 1997). Unreported 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. P-values appear in brackets. For brevity, the 
annual time dummies and industry dummies are not presented.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, 
and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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Independent Variables 
1 
(MSHARE) 
2 
(MSHARE) 
3 
(REV_G) 
4 
(REV_G) 
5 
(OROA) 
6 
(OROA) 
logLIQ 0.004  -0.167***  2.074***  
 [0.985]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
CASH_TA  -0.000**  0.001**  0.001 
  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.171] 
logMCAP 3.056*** 3.059*** -0.037*** -0.055*** 5.540*** 5.761*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
logBM 1.276*** 1.284*** -0.159*** -0.203*** 5.116*** 5.555*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
BLEV 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.219] [0.911] [0.979] [0.918] 
OROE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   
 [0.420] [0.433] [0.491] [0.382]   
FA_TA -0.034** -0.035** 0.003*** 0.005*** -0.198*** -0.205*** 
 [0.018] [0.016] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
RD_TA 0.001 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001** -0.016 -0.018 
 [0.170] [0.021] [0.000] [0.042] [0.132] [0.104] 
DIVDUM -0.137*** -0.136*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 1.591** 2.203*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.000] 
CONSTANT 1.764 2.126 -0.024 -0.182 -43.219*** -42.476*** 
 [0.568] [0.494] [0.976] [0.817] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 24,711 24,711 13,908 13,908 24,766 24,766 
R-squared 0.303 0.303 0.422 0.418 0.324 0.318 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Appendix 8 presents the fixed effects regressions estimating the relation between market share, revenue growth, 
profitability and liquidity for a sample of publicly-traded firms. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the 
liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); 
CASH_TA is cash & cash equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; 
logMCAP is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; 
BLEV is book leverage; OROE is operating return on equity, which earnings before and interest and taxes divided 
by firm equity; FA_TA is fixed assets scaled by net assets; RD_TA is research and development expenses scaled by 
net assets; DIVDUM is a dummy variable equal to one if firm pays dividends, and 0 otherwise. All models include 
dummies for time and industry affiliation (Fama-French, 1997). Unreported standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. P-values appear in brackets. For brevity, the annual time 
dummies and industry dummies are not presented.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, 
and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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Independent Variables 
1 
(WACC) 
2 
(ALTZ) 
3 
(CAPX) 
4 
(MSHARE) 
5 
(OROA) 
logLIQ 0.558 -0.278 0.106** 0.074* 0.283*** 
 [0.140] [0.102] [0.034] [0.097] [0.009] 
logMCAP 16.715*** 3.325*** 0.036 0.866*** 8.329*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.719] [0.004] [0.000] 
logBM -5.703 0.271 -0.199* 0.667*** 5.355*** 
 [0.000] [0.671] [0.095] [0.007] [0.000] 
BLEV 0.030 -0.100*** 0.004** 0.001 0.004 
 [0.972] [0.003] [0.076] [0.244] [0.709] 
OROE -0.161 -0.000 0.000 -0.000**  
 [0.106] [0.825] [0.771] [0.045]  
FA_TA 20.463*** 0.039 -0.011 -0.003 -0.118*** 
 [0.001] [0.484] [0.279] [0.568] [0.000] 
RD_TA 0.008 -0.157*** 0.002 0.000** -0.34*** 
 [0.613] [0.000] [0.294] [0.074] [0.001] 
WACCt-1 -0.456***     
 [0.000]     
WACCt-2 -0.438***     
 [0.000]     
ALTZt-1  0.316***    
  [0.000]    
ALTZt-2  -0.580***    
  [0.000]    
CAPXt-1   0.413***   
   [0.000]   
CAPXt-2   0.008***   
   [0.701]   
MSHAREt-1    0.459****  
    [0.000]  
MSHAREt-2    -0.025  
    [0.167]  
OROAt-1     -0.020 
     [0.682] 
OROAt-2     0.003 
     [0.866] 
Observations 5,732 14,067 14,153 14,212 14,210 
AR(1) test (p-value) [0.000] [0.019] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] 
AR(2) test (p-value) [0.003] [0.114] [0.2755] [0.495] [0.025] 
Sargan test (p-value) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Appendix 9 presents the dynamic GMM estimate of the relation between cost of capital, financial 
distress, capital expenditures, market share, profitability and liquidity for a sample of publicly-traded 
firms. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash 
equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); CASH_TA is cash & cash 
equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; logMCAP is 
the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; 
BLEV is book leverage; OROE is operating return on equity, which earnings before and interest and 
taxes divided by firm equity; FA_TA is fixed assets scaled by net assets; RD_TA is research and 
development expenses scaled by net assets; All models include dummies for time. Unreported standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for 
first-order and second order serial correlation, under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test of 
over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. P-values appear in brackets. For 
brevity, the annual time dummies are not presented.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively.. 
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FIGURE 1: UNIVARIATES BY QUINTILE
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Figure 1 presents univariates of key variables by liquidity quintile. (Quintile 1 contains the least liquid firms. Quintile 5 contains the 
most liquid firms). logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and 
available line of credit divided by cash volatility); Cost of capital is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC); Altman Z-score 
is a modified Altman (1968) Z-score of financial distress; Capital expenditures is capital expenditures scaled by net assets; R & D 
expenses are research and development expenses scaled by net assets; Market share is firm’s market share, calculated as percentage 
of industry revenues; Operating return on assets is earnings before interest and taxes divided by net assets. 
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PART 2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Dividend policy is an important decision in the life of a firm. Graham and Harvey (2001) 
finds that CFOs consider their decisions regarding dividend distributions to be one of the most 
important decisions they make. Young firms that are growing quickly and subject to liquidity 
issues typically choose not to pay dividends. DeAngelo & DeAngelo (2006) find that investors 
are willing to forgo dividends for potential growth opportunities; however as a firm matures and 
its growth opportunities begin to decrease, investors expect management to payout excess cash 
as dividends or stock repurchases.13  Once the firm begins paying dividends, their continued 
payment is expected and is priced into a firm’s stock (Lintner, 1956). Additionally Lintner 
hypothesizes that firms that decrease dividends will experience a dramatic decline in stock 
prices, thus managers are hesitant to changes dividends.  Pettit (1972), Ahrony & Swary (1980), 
Woolridge (1982, 1983), Eades et al. (1985), and Healy & Palepu (1988) show that dividend 
paying firms that decrease dividend payouts experience price declines.  This is why dividends 
are considered to be “sticky”.   Given the managers desire to maintain dividends, we investigate 
if dividend paying firms use credit lines (i.e. lines of credit)  to pay dividends when cash is 
scarce.  Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) finds that maintaining dividend levels in on 
par with investment decisions and managers only cut dividends in extraordinary circumstances.  
                                                          
13
 Gaver & Gaver (1993) 
 51 
 
The stickiness of dividends in reaffirmed in a 2004-05 survey of CFOs by Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, & Michaely. 
 Credit lines occupy an unusual space in corporate research.  As a short-term liability, 
credit lines are considered part of a firm’s capital structure; whereas recent research considers 
credit lines as cash substitutes.  Sufi (2009), Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) and Kahle and 
Stulz (2013) provide a strong rationale for including available credit lines in liquidity measures.  
Since dividend payouts are dependent on firm liquidity, credit lines through their dual role as 
liquidity substitute and capital structure component provide a link between payout policy and 
capital structure.  We utilize a comprehensive measure of liquidity that combines cash and 
markeappendix securities as well as available credit lines.
14
  Almeida, et al. (2013) conclude that 
the predominate use of cash and cash equivalents in existing studies has clouded their findings 
and more comprehensive measures of liquidity should be used in future research. Our liquidity 
measure is an index based on Emery and Cogger’s (1982) lambda15. Our liquidity index, 
logLIQi,t, is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available credit divided by cash volatility, 
where cash volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of cash and cash equivalents. The benefit 
of this index is it is more effective at assessing solvency since a lower (higher) measure indicates 
that a firm is more (less) likely to become insolvent (Emery, 1984).  
                                                          
14
 OPSW (1999), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2013) all focus on cash and cash equivalents. 
15
 Emery and Cogger’s lambda is computed as the sum of daily cash & equivalents, available credit lines, and 
expected cash flow divided by daily standard deviation of cash. Using daily data their lambda can be interpreted as a 
Z-score that indicates the probability of being illiquid.  
 52 
 
 Additionally, we investigate DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner ‘s (2009) hypothesis that 
there is a link between a firm’s payout policy and its capital structure.  They posit that payout 
policy, especially for firms trying to maintain or establish a managerial reputation for returning 
cash to investors, is an important determinant of a firm’s ability to raise capital.  Due to the 
potential agency costs associated with excess cash, liquidity from credit lines could help firms 
mitigate investor concerns, while allowing firms to maintain optimal payouts.    
 Using a sample of over 5,400 publicly traded firms we find that there is a positive 
relation between firm liquidity and dividend payouts. We also find a significant positive relation 
between credit line balances and dividends for cash constrained dividend paying firms.  
Additionally, trend analysis indicates that dividend paying firms consistently utilize credit lines, 
with a noappendix increase in credit line balances in the few years prior to the 2008-2009 
financial crisis.  Our results indicate that credit lines are related to dividend payouts.   
 Our paper is closely related to Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz (2015). They 
examine the use of debt and equity to finance dividends and share repurchases. They find 32% of 
firm payouts are simultaneously raised in capital markets. This suggests that firms use financed 
payouts to manage their capital structure, monitor managers, engage in market timing, and boost 
earnings-per-share.  We focus specifically on the use of credit lines as an alternate source of 
liquidity to fund cash payouts, and not the firms use of equity or other debt securities.  We see 
our results as complementary to the findings Farre-Mensa et.al. (2015) and believe both 
contribute to the overall dividend literature.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 Lintner’s (1956) seminal survey article found managers were reluctant to cut dividends.  
Not much has changed since, as firms are still hesitant to decrease dividend payouts. Brav et al. 
(2005) finds that firms would sacrifice positive NPV projects in order to maintain the expected 
dividend payout. In their survey 94% of the managers strongly agreed that they try to avoid 
reducing dividends. Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2008) find that only about six percent of firms 
will cut dividends when facing a cash shortage that would require the firm to reduce investment, 
cut dividends or raise outside funds.  Research indicates that managers are wise to not to reduce 
dividends since dividend reductions are often followed by a significant decline in the firm’s 
share price. Ghosh and Woolridge (1989) find a significant negative response to dividend cuts 
even when accompanied by a management statement that indicates the cuts are necessary to fund 
profiappendix investment opportunities.  Healy & Palepu (1988) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (1992) show this negative reaction is a rational response to a negative signal.  Both show 
dividends cuts are usually associated with significant earnings declines.   
 Over the years a number of studies have examined the relation between cash flows and 
payout policies.   Healy (1985) suggests that cash flows are better predictors of dividend policy 
than earnings due to the potential manipulation of earnings through accruals management. Jensen 
(1986) posits that if firms have free cash flows, they should return excess cash to shareholders 
via dividend payout to reduce potential agency costs.   Charitou, Clubb, and Andreou (1998) 
suggest that cash flows are more useful than accruals in predicting dividends since cash flows are 
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a more direct liquidity measure and liquidity is likely to be a determinant of dividend policy. 
Simons (1994) finds a positive association between cash flows and dividends through a more 
refined version of the Lintner (1956) cash flow measure.  Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan 
(1999) suggest the declining reinvestment of mature firms generate excess cash which is then 
paid out as dividends.  
 Lawson and Moeller (1996) suggest that dividend payments should be based on cash 
flows, and not on accrual earnings, because cash flows better reflect the liquidity position of a 
company rather than earnings.  They assert that dividend payments made based on accrual 
earnings may lead to 1) dividends payments not funded by internal finance, 2) external 
borrowing to fully or partially fund dividend payments, 3) deterioration of the liquidity and 
solvency position of the firm, and 4) transfer shareholder wealth to lenders via financing costs.   
They show that for the period 1946-1977, dividends exceeded cash flows and that dividends 
based on accrual earnings were mostly debt financed.  Since liquid firms are more likely to pay 
dividends, we hypothesize that liquidity impacts firm dividend policy.  
  H1: Dividend policy is positively related to firm liquidity. 
  Firms that historically pay dividends are reluctant to cut dividend payouts due to the 
negative stock price reaction when dividends are cut. Thus we hypothesize that dividend paying 
firms will use credit lines to maintain dividend payouts.  
 H2: Dividend paying firms that experience a cash shortage will use credit lines  
  to pay dividends. 
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 We also investigate DeAngelo et al.’s (2009) suggestion that dividend policy and capital 
structure are related. We test the permanence of credit lines in dividend paying firm’s capital 
structure.  
  H3: Dividend paying firms rely more heavily on credit lines than non-payers.  
  
 56 
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 We collect all Compustat firms excluding firms in the financial service and utility 
industries. In order to compute our liquidity index, we merge the Compustat sample with the 
Standard & Poors Capital IQ database which contains line of credit data for all publicly traded 
firms. The Capital IQ data includes information on bond issuances, long-term fixed-rate 
obligations, variable-rate obligations, commercial paper, credit facilities, and other obligations.  
Our Capital IQ data is available for the period 2002 – 2013. Other firm characteristics used as 
control variables come from COMPUSTAT.  Finally we trim the variables below the one percent 
and above the ninety-nine percent levels to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers.  The final 
sample consists of a panel of 41,397 firm-year observations for 5,430 firms.   
 Appendix 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. The typical firm in our 
sample has just over $5.2 billion in assets, $534 million in cash and markeappendix securities, 
$143 million on credit lines, almost a $5.0 billion market capitalization, a liquidity index of 
2.226, and pays almost $99 million in dividends. 
 Appendix 2 reports the Spearmen Correlations for our primary variables of interest and 
the control variables.  Three correlation matrices are reported: Panel A reports the correlations 
for the full sample, Panel B for the dividend paying firms and Panel C for the non-payers. Two 
additional variables are included in the correlation matrix, the change in dividends from period t 
to t-1 (DIV_dif) and the change in credit lines for period t to t-1 (LOC_dif). Panels A and B 
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report significant and negative correlations between the change in credit lines and dividends, 
while Panel C for non-payers reports a significant and positive correlation.
16
   
 Equation 1 examines the relation between cash dividends paid and firm liquidity. We 
expect to find a positive relation between loqliqi,t and DIVSi,t.  
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑜 +  𝛽1𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽1𝑏𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,        (1) 
 
where DIVSi,t is cash dividends scaled by net assets paid by firm i for period t, and net assets is 
total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; logLIQi,t is our liquidity index, computed as the 
sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available credit divided by cash volatility, where cash 
volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of cash and cash equivalents. We believe this 
measure of liquidity better captures overall firm liquidity by including available credit lines.
17
  
We will also test Cashi,t as an alternative definition of liquidity. Cashi,t,is firm cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by net assets. logMCAPi,t, firm market capitalization and logBMi,t , book-to-
market,  control for firm size. BLEVi,t  is long-term debt scaled by net assets and controls for firm 
financial policies. OROAi,t , operating return on assets computed by dividing earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) scaled by net assets,  controls for firm profitability.  CAPXi,t , which is 
capital expenditures divided by net assets, controls for investment policies.  We expect a positive 
                                                          
16 None of the correlations cause multicollinearity concerns.   
17
 Recent studies by Sufi (2009), Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) and Kahle and Stulz (2013) have expanded their 
definition of liquidity to include a firm’s credit lines. 
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relation between dividends, liquidity, cash, firm size, and profitability.  Debt servicing and 
capital expenditures require are expected to be negatively related to dividend payouts.  It also 
includes fixed effects for time and industry (Fama & French, 1997). 
 Equation 2 is a probit model that examines the likelihood that a firm’s liquidity increases 
the probability that a firm pays a dividend.    
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛼1𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛼1𝑏𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼4𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,        (2) 
 
where DIVDUMi,t is dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. 
ROEi,t is operating return on equity computed by dividing earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) scaled by equity controls for firm profitability.
18
  All other variables are defined above.  
 Equation 3 tests hypothesis 2: the relation between dividends and lines of credit for 
dividend paying firms.   
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾𝑜 +  𝜸𝟏𝒂𝑳𝑶𝑪𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾6𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑑_𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛾9𝐿𝑂𝐶_𝑥_𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,       (3) 
 
                                                          
18
 The probit model would not converge using ROAi,t. 
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where LOCi,t is firm line of credit balances scaled by net assets for firm i in period t. 
lowmed_cashi,t  (lowqtr_cashi,t) is a dummy variable set equal to equal to 1 if the firm’s cash is 
below the median (first quartile).  LOC_x_lowmedi,t is an interaction term between firm credit 
lines and the low cash dummy that measures the utilization of credit lines by firms with below 
average cash.    We expect a positive relation between LOCi,t and DIVSi,t.  We want to 
specifically examine the use of credit lines by firms that are cash constrained.  We anticipate that 
cash constrained firms will utilize credit lines to continue to pay dividends, thus we expect a 
positive relation between DIVSi,t and LOC_x_lowmed (and LOC_x_lowqtr).  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Appendix 3 compares means and medians for dividend payers versus non-dividend 
payers. Our univariate differences indicate the liquidity (logLIQi,t) of dividend payers is 
significantly higher than non-payers which warrant further examination in multivariate models.  
Also, dividend payers have a significantly lower (higher) mean (median) LOCi,t than non-payers. 
Overall, dividend paying firms are larger, more liquid, more profiappendix, have larger market-
to-book, less long-term debt, and less capital expenditures than non-payers.  At first glance, the 
higher liquidity index with less cash seems counterintuitive; however, this is most likely due to 
higher unused credit line balances and/or less volatile cash balances. Additionally non-payers 
may accumulate larger cash balances since they do not have quarterly dividend payouts or more 
financially constrained firms.  
 Multivariate analysis provides additional evidence of the relation between dividends, 
liquidity, credit lines, and other firm characteristics.
19
  Results in Appendix 4, based on equations 
(1) and (2), provide support for our first hypothesis that dividend payments are related to firm 
liquidity.  The parameter estimate of interest, β1a from columns 1 & 3, is positive and significant 
supporting the hypothesis that dividend payments are positively related to firm liquidity. The 
model in Column 2 uses an alternative measure of liquidity, cash scaled by net assets (CASHi,t). 
The coefficient, β1b, is not significant.   logLIQi,t and CASHi,t appear to be measuring different 
aspects of firm liquidity, so we include both measures of liquidity in the model as reported in 
Column 3.  logLIQi,t is still positive and significant while CASHi,t is not significant.  Additional 
                                                          
19
 All regressions are run using pooled OLS with standard errors that are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-
level clustering. 
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results from Columns 1-3 indicate that dividend paying firms are larger, more profiappendix, 
have less debt, and have less capital expenditures.   
 Appendix 5 reports the results from a probit model where the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm pays a dividend and 0 otherwise. The positive and 
significant coefficient of logLIQi,t in this model indicates that more liquid firms are more likely 
to pay dividends; whereas the negative and significant coefficient of CASHi,t suggest that firms 
with more cash are less likely to pay a dividend, supporting the relation found in the univariate 
results.   Other results from the probit model indicate that firms with higher market 
capitalization, higher market-to-book, less leverage, and higher capital expenditures are less 
likely to pay dividends.    
 We use a sample of only on dividend paying firms to test our second hypothesis that 
firms with below average cash use credit lines to pay dividends.   Appendix 6 reports the results 
based on equation (3).  The results presented in this appendix support Column 1 reports the 
results of the base pooled OLS model. Our base model indicates a positive and significant 
relation between credit lines and dividends.  Additionally, as expected firms that pay dividends 
have more cash, less debt, and are more profiappendix.  Two unexpected results from this model 
show that dividend paying firms are smaller and have more capital expenditures warrants further 
investigation.     
 The main results in Appendix 6 are presented in columns 2 and 3 which include   
lowmed_cashi,t  (lowqtr_cashi,t ) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s cash position is below 
the median (first quartile) and 0 otherwise.  The coefficients for these variables are negative and 
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significant indicating that firms with below average cash pay fewer dividends; however, the 
interaction term between the credit line variable and low cash dummies (LOC_x_lowmedi,t) is 
positive and significant. This indicates that if a firm has low cash they are more likely to pay 
dividends from credit lines.  Results also indicate firms with higher market capitalization, higher 
book-to-market, and higher debt levels pay fewer dividends; whereas, more profiappendix firms 
tend to pay more.   
 Column 4 provides additional support for this conclusion by analyzing only the firms 
with below median cash. In this model, the coefficient for credit lines is positive and significant 
while the coefficient for cash is insignificant, which indicates that these firms rely more heavily 
on credit lines to pay dividends than their cash reserves.  
 Dividend paying firms are further examined in columns 1 & 2 of Appendix 7. Pooled 
regressions that examine the relation between changes in dividends (div_dif), changes in credit 
lines (loc_dif), liquidity (logliq) and cash levels (cash_ta) indicate that changes in dividends are 
not significantly related to changes in credit lines; however, they are associated with lower 
liquidity and higher cash balances which may indicate that paying dividends decreases firm 
liquidity by using available credit lines while preserving cash.  In column 3, this relation is 
further examined for all firms using a probit model where the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for firms that had a positive change in dividends.  This model shows a 
positive relation between firm liquidity and positive dividend changes indicating that more liquid 
firms are more likely to increase their dividends providing additional support for hypothesis 1.  
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 Appendix 8 and Figures 1 – 3 examine the trend of credit lines as part of firm capital 
structure.  The results show that dividend payers consistently utilize credit lines in the capital 
structure; however, non-payers also utilize them to an even larger extent.  For the period 2002 – 
2013, dividend paying firms had smaller credit line to net asset ratios and smaller long-term debt 
ratios than non-payers. The only exception to this was for the period 2006 – 2008 when dividend 
paying firms had higher credit line to net asset ratios than dividend payers.  This period leads 
into the financial crisis and warrants further investigation.  
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CONCLUSION 
 This paper is the first to examine the extent to which firms utilize credit lines to fund cash 
dividends, and the relation between an expanded measure of liquidity (logLIQ) and dividends.  
We hypothesize that higher dividend payouts are related to higher liquidity and dividend paying 
firms that experience cash shortages with utilize credit lines to continue dividend payments. 
Additionally we hypothesize that credit lines are a permanent component of dividend paying 
firms’ capital structure. Our univariate results indicate that dividend paying firms are 
considerably different than non-payers. Dividend payers tend to have higher liquidity, less cash, 
smaller credit line balances, higher market capitalizations, less long-term debt, are more 
profiappendix, and spend less on capital investments.  Multivariate results indicate that liquidity 
is an important determinant of dividend payouts; however, cash is not. Additionally, our analysis 
supports the hypothesis that cash strapped dividend paying firms will use credit lines to continue 
dividend payments.  Trend analysis indicates credit lines are a consistently over four percent of 
dividend paying firms’ capital structure; however, non-payers may use credit lines to an even 
larger extent.     
 65 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 66 
 
 
Almeida, H., M. Camello, I. Cunha, and M. Weisbach, 2013, “Corporate Liquidity Management: 
 A Conceptual Framework and Survey,” Dice Center WP 2013-15. 
 
Ahrony, J. and I. Swary, 1980, “Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and 
 Stockholder  Returns: an Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Finance 35, 1-12.  
 
Bates, T., K. Kahle and R. Stulz, 2009, “Why Do U.S. Firms hold so much More Cash Than 
 They Used To?” Journal of Finance 64, 1985-2021. 
 
Brav, A., J.R. Graham, C.R. Harvey, and R. Michaely, 2008, “Payout Policy in the 21st Century,” 
 Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483-528. 
 
Charitou, A., C. Clubb, and A. Andreou, 1998, “The Value Relevance of Cash Flows and 
 Earnings after  Controlling for Earnings Permanence, Growth, and Firm Size: Empirical 
 Evidence for Germany and the U.S.,” European Accounting Congress 
 
Daniel, N.D., D.J. Denis, L. Naveen, 2008, “Do Firms Manage Earnings to Meet Dividend 
 Thresholds?” Journal of Accounting and Economics 45, 2 – 26. 
 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. Skinner, 1992, “Dividends and Losses,” Journal of Finance 
 47, 1837-1863.  
 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. Skinner, 2009, “Corporate Payout Policy,” Foundations and 
 Trends in Finance, Vol. 3, Nos. 2-3, 95-287. 
 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and R. Stulz, 2006, “Dividend Policy and the Earned/Contributed 
 Capital Mix: a Test of the Life-Cycle Theory,” Journal of Financial Economics 81, 227-
 254. 
  
Eades, K.M., P. Hess, and E.H. Kim, 1985, “Market Rationality and Dividend Announcements,” 
 Journalof Financial Economics 15, 581-604.  
 
Farre-Mensa, J., R. Michaely, M. Schmalz, 2015, “Financing Payouts,” working paper   
 
Faulkender, M. and R. Wang, 2006, “Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash,” 
 Journal of Finance 61, 1957-1990. 
 
Gaver, J. and K. Gaver, 1993, “Additional Evidence on the Association between the Investment 
 Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies,” 
 Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 101-124. 
 
 67 
 
Ghosh, C. and J.R. Woolridge, 1989, “Stock-market Reaction to Growth-induced Dividend Cuts: 
 Are Investors Myopic?” Managerial and Decision Economics 10, 25-35.  
 
Grullon, G., R. Michaely, and B. Swaminathan, 1999, “Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm 
 Maturity?” Journal of Business 75, 387-424. 
 
Healy, P., 1985, “The Effects of Bonus Schemes on  Accounting Decisions,” Journal of 
 Accounting and Economics 7, 85-107. 
Healy, P. and K.G. Palepu, 1988, “Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and 
 Omissions,” Journal of Financial Economics 21, 149-176. 
 
Healy, P. and K.G. Palepu, 1990, “Effectives of Accounting based Dividend Covenants,” 
 Journal of Accounting and Economics 12, 97-123.  
 
Jensen, M., 1986, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,” 
 American Economic Review 76, 323-329. 
 
Kahle, K. and R. Stulz, 2013, “Access to Capital, Investment, and the Financial Crisis,” Journal 
 of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Lang, L., H.P. Litzenberger, and R. H. Litzenberger, 1989, “Dividend Announcements: Cash 
 Flow Signaling vs Free Cash Flow Hypothesis,” Journal of Financial Economics 24, 
 181-191. 
 
Lawson, G., and H.P. Moeller, 1996, “The Cash Flow Effect of Retained Earnings Measured on 
 a Conservative Basis,” working paper, Martin-Luther-Universitat-Halle-Wittenberg. 
 
Lins, K., H. Servaes, and P. Tufano, 2010, “What Drives Corporate Liquidity? An International 
 Survey of Cash Holdings and Lines of Credit,” Journal of Financial Economics 98, 160-
 176. 
Lintner, J., 1956, “Optimal Dividends and Corporate Growth under Uncertainty,” The Quarterly 
 Journal of Economics 78, 49-95. 
 
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson, 1999, “The Determinants and Implications 
 of Corporate Cash Holdings,” Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3-46. 
 
Pettit, R., 1972, “Dividend Announcements, Security Performance, and Capital Market 
 Efficiency,” Journal of Finance 27, 9933-1007.  
 
Pinkowitz, L., R. Stulz, and R. Williamson, 2013, “Multinationals and the High Cash Holdings 
 Puzzle,” NBER working paper series 
 68 
 
 
Simons, K., 1994, “The relationship Between Dividend Changes and Cash Flow: An Empirical 
 Analysis,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 21, 577-587. 
 
Sufi, A., 2009, “Bank lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis,” Review of 
 Financial Studies 22, 1057-1088.  
 
Woolridge, J.R., 1982, “The Information Content of Dividend Changes,” Journal of Financial 
 Research 5, 237-247. 
 
Woolridge, J.R., 1983, “Dividend Changes and Security Prices,” Journal of Finance 38, 1607-
 1615. 
 
  
 69 
 
 
LISTS OF APPENDICES 
 70 
 
APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR MAIN VARIABLES AND CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
  
 
7
1
 
Panel A: Level values (n = 41,397) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 5th % Median 95th % Max 
Cash & MS 534,027,076 2,650,343,135 0.004 244.500 48,206,290 2,062,280,000 91,052,000,000 
Dividends 98,710,223 593,071,737 0 0 0 328,554,920 13,660,920,000 
LOC 142,752,997 1,271,087,012 0 0 4,687,000 455,370,000 70,603,680,000 
Market Cap 4,983,368,773 20,589,358,546 0 2,961.150 418,758,840 20,780,066,824 564,748,329,600 
Total assets 5,236,253,220 24,656,634,119 0.240 3,232.190 439,999,290 20,826,640,000 923,123,610,000 
 
Panel B: Scaled Variables (n =41,397) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 5
th
 % Median 95
th
 % Max 
logLIQ 2.200 1.095 -0.161 0.498 2.129 4.158 6.167 
CASH_net 0.426 0.948 0.001 0.007 0.131 1.830 10.135 
DIVS_net 0.926% 2.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.069 19.786 
LOC_net 4.475% 9.116 0.000 0.000 0.000 24.253 65.795 
logMCAP 19.143 4.099 -2.952 7.998 19.853 23.758 27.060 
logBM -0.743 0.936 -8.993 -2.216 -0.704 0.617 12.211 
BLEV 24.626% 52.759 0.000 0.000 15.278 71.553 3,080.360 
OROA -12.543% 134.740 -13,476.920 -98.412 6.867 28.326 2,729.760 
OROE 25.136% 3,359.920 -125,575.000 -91.464 13.562 70.495 551,925.000 
FA_net 62.760% 22.844 0.000 20.890 65.145 94.821 100.0000 
RD_EXP 363.010 18,620.630 -21873.680 0.000 3.995 133.258 2,568,440.000 
CAPX_net 6.923 8.675 -33.937 0.582 4.182 22.644 237.707 
Appendix 1 reports summary statistics for the measures of liquidity, dividends, line of credit balance, firm size, leverage, profitability, fixed assets, and 
research and development expenditures. Cash & MS  is firm cash balances; Dividends are firm cash dividends; LOC is firm credit line balances; Market 
Cap is firm’s market capitalization; Total assets is firm’s total assets; logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of 
cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); CASH_net is cash & cash equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is 
total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; DIVS_net is ordinary dividends scaled by net assets;  LOC_net is the line of credit balance scaled by net 
assets; logMCAP is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; BLEV is book leverage; 
OROA is operating return on assets, which is earnings before interest and taxes divided by net assets; OROE is operating return on equity, which 
earnings before and interest and taxes divided by firm equity; FA_net is fixed assets scaled by net assets; and RD_EXP is research and development 
expenses scaled by net assets; CAPX_net  is firm’s capital expenditures scaled by net assets.   
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APPENDIX 2: SPEARMEN CORRELATIONS 
  
 
7
3 
Panel A: Correlations between dividends, lines of credit, liquidity measures, and controls (Full sample) 
 LOC_net DIV_net LOC_dif DIV_dif LogLIQ CASH_net logMCAP logBM BLEV OROA OROE 
LOC_net 1.000           
DIV_net 0.017 1.000          
LOC_dif 0.236 -0.003 1.000         
DIV_dif -0.028 0.251 -0.034 1.000        
LogLIQ 0.223 0.166 -0.017 0.036 1.000       
CASH_net -0.479 -0.189 -0.036 0.024 -0.248 1.000      
LogMCAP -0.080 0.442 -0.034 0.113 0.147 -0.082 1.000     
LogBM 0.154 -0.099 0.026 -0.055 0.0827 -0.208 -0.366 1.000    
BLEV 0.213 0.097 0.011 -0.005 0.053 -0.341 0.232 -0.040 1.000   
OROA -0.016 0.343 -0.053 0.126 0.144 -0.055 0.457 -0.303 -0.016 1.000  
OROE 0.104 0.378 -0.043 0.110 0.182 -0.276 0.492 -0.307 0.253 0.850 1.000 
Panel B: Correlations between dividends, lines of credit, liquidity measures, and controls (Dividend Payers) 
 LOC_net DIV_net LOC_dif DIV_dif LogLIQ CASH_net logMCAP logBM BLEV OROA OROE 
LOC_net 1.000           
DIV_net -0.160 1.000          
LOC_dif 0.209 0.018 1.000         
DIV_dif -0.064 0.252 -0.051 1.000        
LogLIQ 0.218 -0.059 -0.010 -0.022 1.000       
CASH_TA -0.389 0.272 -0.035 0.167 -0.300 1.000      
LogMCAP -0.198 0.097 -0.022 0.019 -0.013 0.008 1.000     
LogBM 0.112 -0.360 0.005 -0.089 0.034 -0.121 -0.413 1.000    
BLEV 0.228 -0.160 0.010 -0.082 0.052 -0.328 -0.143 -0.065 1.000   
OROA -0.180 0.386 -0.028 0.179 -0.077 0.304 -0.259 -0.582 -0.199 1.000  
OROE -0.038 0.208 -0.005 0.085 -0.020 -0.031 0.360 -0.663 0.240 0.717 1.000 
Panel C: Correlations between dividends, lines of credit, liquidity measures, and controls (Non-dividend payers) 
 LOC_net DIV_net LOC_dif DIV_dif LogLIQ CASH_net logMCAP logBM BLEV OROA OROE 
LOC_net 1.000           
DIV_net - 1.000          
LOC_dif 0.252 - 1.000         
DIV_dif -0.043 - 0.001 1.000        
LogLIQ 0.219 - -0.019 -0.014 1.000       
CASH_TA -0.518 - -0.039 0.072 -0.172 1.000      
LogMCAP -0.090 - -0.042 -0.019 0.123 0.039 1.000     
LogBM 0.177 - 0.037 -0.075 0.119 -0.272 -0.365 1.000    
BLEV 0.209 - 0.013 -0.039 0.021 -0.318 0.196 -0.020 1.000   
OROA 0.054 - -0.065 0.003 0.186 -0.142 0.426 -0.161 0.013 1.000  
OROE 0.153 - -0.061 -0.022 0.211 -0.294 0.419 -0.142 0.203 0.898 1.000 
Appendix 2 ; logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); 
CASH_net is cash & cash equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; DIVS_net is ordinary dividends scaled by net assets;  LOC_net is 
the line of credit balance scaled by net assets; logMCAP is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; BLEV is book 
leverage; OROA is operating return on assets, which is earnings before interest and taxes divided by net assets; OROE is operating return on equity, which earnings before and 
interest and taxes divided by firm equity; FA_net is fixed assets scaled by net assets; and RD_EXP is research and development expenses scaled by net assets; CAPX_net  is firm’s 
capital expenditures scaled by net assets.  *Bold and italicized values are significant at the 1.0% and 5.0% level, respectively, otherwise not significantly different than zero.   
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APPENDIX 3: DIVIDEND PAYERS VS NON-DIVIDEND PAYERS 
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Variable 
Dividend 
Payers 
(n = 12,985) 
Non-dividend 
Payers  
(n = 28,412) 
Difference 
Dividend 
Payers 
(n = 12,985) 
Non-dividend 
Payers  
(n = 28,412) 
Difference Mean Mean Median Median 
logLIQ 2.524 2.051 2.473*** 2.432 1.985 0.447** 
CASH_net 0.157 0.550 -0.393*** 0.080 0.176 -0.096* 
DIVS_net 2.953 0.000 2.953*** 1.952 0.000 1.952*** 
LOC_net 4.194 4.603 -0.409*** 0.055 0.000 0.055** 
logMCAP 20.844 18.364 2.480* 21.395 19.191 2.204 
logBM -0.780 -0.725 0.055 -0.743 -0.682 0.058 
BLEV 21.940 25.857 -3.917*** 19.865 11.638 8.227*** 
OROA 11.878 -23.710 -13.979*** 10.368 4.238 5.988*** 
OROE 26.717 24.414 2.303* 21.439 8.527 12.912*** 
CAPX_net 6.444 7.141 -0.697 4.459 4.013 0.446 
Appendix 3 compares means and medians for dividend payers versus non-dividend payers. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity 
index (the liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); CASH_net is 
cash & cash equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; DIVS_net is ordinary dividends 
scaled by net assets; LOC_net is the line of credit balance scaled by net assets; logMCAP is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; 
logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; BLEV is book leverage; OROA is operating return on assets, which is 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by firm assets; OROE is operating return on equity, which earnings before and interest and 
taxes divided by firm equity. .  *, **, and *** indicate statistically significant differences at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, 
respectively. 
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APPENDIX 4: LIQUIDITY AND DIVIDENDS 
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Independent 
Variables 
1 
(DIVS_Net) 
2 
(DIVS_Net) 
3 
(DIVS_Net) 
logliq 0.068***  0.068*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000] 
cash_net  0.011 0.011 
  [0.609] [0.618] 
logmcap 0.218*** 0.225*** 0.218*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
logbm -0.227*** -0.217*** -0.226*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
blev -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
oroa 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
capx_net -0.006** -0.007*** -0.006** 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.013] 
constant -0.985*** -0.938*** -0.986*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 38,138 38,138 38,138 
R-squared 0.138 0.137 0.138 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Appendix 4 presents the fixed effects regressions estimating the relation between dividends and liquidity 
for a sample of publicly-traded firms. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is 
the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); DIVDUM is a 
dummy variable equal to one if firm pays dividends, and 0 otherwise; CASH_NET is cash & cash 
equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; logMCAP is the 
logarithm of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; BLEV 
is book leverage; OROA is operating return on assets, which is earnings before interest and taxes divided 
by firm assets; OROE is operating return on equity, which earnings before and interest and taxes divided 
by firm equity;. All models include dummies for time and industry affiliation (Fama-French, 1997). 
Unreported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. For 
brevity, the annual time dummies and industry dummies are not presented.  P-values appear in brackets. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 5: LIQUIDITY AND DIVIDENDS – PROBIT 
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Independent 
Variables 
1 
(DIV_DUM) 
2 
(DIV_DUM) 
3 
(DIV_DUM) 
logliq 0.163***  0.133*** 
 (0.007)  (0.011) 
cash_net  -0.994*** -0.949*** 
  (0.042) (0.063) 
logmcap 0.106*** -0.030*** -0.045** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.016) 
logbm 0.040*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) 
blev 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oroe 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capx_net -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
constant -2.844*** -2.295*** -2.454*** 
 (0.076) (0.071) (0.086) 
Observations 38,138 38,138 38,138 
R-squared    
Time dummies NO NO NO 
Industry dummies NO NO NO 
Appendix 5 presents the Probit models estimating the likelihood of paying dividends for a sample of 
publicly-traded firms. logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of 
cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); DIVDUM is a dummy 
variable equal to one if firm pays dividends, and 0 otherwise; CASH_NET is cash & cash equivalents 
scaled by net assets, net assets is total assets minus cash & cash equivalents; logMCAP is the logarithm 
of firm market capitalization; logBM is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; BLEV is book 
leverage; OROE is operating return on equity, which earnings before and interest and taxes divided by 
firm equity;. All models include dummies for time and industry affiliation (Fama-French, 1997). 
Unreported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. For 
brevity, the annual time dummies and industry dummies are not presented.  P-values appear in brackets. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 6: DIVIDENDS AND LINES OF CREDIT 
  
 
8
1 
Independent Variables 
1 
(DIVS_net) 
2 
(DIVS_net) 
3 
(DIVS_net) 
4 
(DIVS_net) 
lowmed=1 
loc_net 0.007** 0.002 0.005 0.011* 
 [0.014] [0.855] [0.383] [0.057] 
cash_net 2.411*** 2.518*** 2.622*** 2.485 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.226] 
logmcap -0.219*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.176*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] 
logbm -0.979*** -0.754*** -0.756*** -0.834*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
blev -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.003 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.550] 
oroa 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.063*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
capx_net 0.012*** 0.014* 0.015* -0.001 
 [0.002] [0.093] [0.077] [0.892] 
lowmed_cash  -0.259***   
  [0.010]   
LOC_x_lowmed  0.032***   
  [0.001]   
lowqtr_cash   -0.267***  
   [0.006]  
LOC_x_lowqtr   0.024**  
   [0.014]  
constant 2.028*** 1.226*** 1.159*** 1.587*** 
 [0.000] [0.005] [0.008] [0.001] 
Observations 12,663 12,663 12,663 6,302 
R-squared 0.276 0.247 0.247 0.205 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Appendix 6 presents the pooled fixed effects regressions estimating the relation between dividends and lines of credit for a sample of publicly-traded 
firms that pay dividends. loc_net is line of credit balance divided by net assets; cash_net is cash & cash equivalents scaled by net assets, net assets is total 
assets minus cash & cash equivalents; logmcap is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logbm is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio; 
blev is book leverage; oroa is operating return on assets, which is earnings before interest and taxes divided by firm assets; lowmed_cash is a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s cash_net is below the median; LOC_x_lowmed is an interaction term that is the product of loc_net and lowmed_cash; 
lowqtr_cash is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s cash_net is below the first quartile; LOC_x_lowqtr is an interaction term that is the product 
of loc_net and lowqtr_cash; . All models include dummies for time and industry affiliation (Fama-French, 1997). Unreported standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. For brevity, the annual time dummies and industry dummies are not presented.  P-values appear 
in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
 82 
 
APPENDIX 7: CHANGES IN DIVIDENDS RELATIVE TO CHANGES IN CREDIT LINES 
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Independent Variables 
1 
(Div_dif) 
2 
(Div_dif) 
3 
(Pos_div=1) 
loc_dif -0.0001  0.002 
 (0.272)  (0.261) 
loc_lag  -0.0000  
  (0.415)  
logliq -0.0007*** -0.0007** 0.134*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
cash_net 0.0087*** 0.0089*** -0.719*** 
 (0.000) (0.000_ (0.000) 
logmcap -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 0.284*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
logbm -0.0019*** -0.0019*** 0.076*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
blev -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.002*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
oroa 0.0003*** 0.0003***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
oroe   0.000 
   (0.111) 
capx_net -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.004*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) 
constant 0.963** 0.936**  
 (0.022) (0.025)  
Observations 11,036 11,036 31,686 
R-squared 0.094 0.094  
Time dummies YES YES NO 
Industry dummies YES YES NO 
Appendix 7: Columns 1 & 2 present the pooled fixed effects regressions estimating the relation between change in 
dividends and changes in lines of credit for a sample of publicly-traded firms that pay dividends. Column 3 presents the 
Probit model estimating the likelihood of a positive change in dividends given a change in credit lines for a sample of 
publicly-traded firms. Div_dif is the change dividends from period t to t-1 divided by net assets from period t; Pos_div is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the change in dividends is positive, and 0 otherwise; loc_dif  is the change line of 
credit balance divided by net assets from period t to t-1; loc_lag is the lagged change in line of credit variable (loc_dif); 
logliq is the logarithm of the liquidity index (the liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available line of 
credit divided by cash volatility); logmcap is the logarithm of firm market capitalization; logbm is the logarithm of the 
book-to-market equity ratio; blev is book leverage; oroa is operating return on assets, which is earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by firm assets; oroe is operating return on equity, which earnings before and interest and taxes divided 
by firm equity; . Pooled regressions include dummies for time and industry affiliation (Fama-French, 1997). Unreported 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. For brevity, the annual time dummies 
and industry dummies are not presented.  P-values appear in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 8: LIQUIDITY, LINES OF CREDIT, AND LONG-TERM DEBT BY YEAR FOR 
DIVIDEND PAYERS AND NON-PAYERS 
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 Dividend Payers Non-dividend Payers Difference 
FYEAR logLIQ LOC_net BLEV logLIQ LOC_net BLEV logLIQ LOC_net BLEV 
2002 2.390 4.011 22.326 1.882 5.436 24.478 0.508** -1.425** -2.152*** 
2003 2.629 3.455 20.130 2.008 4.476 26.518 0.621** -1.021** -6.388*** 
2004 2.558 3.127 19.530 2.077 3.938 25.489 0.481* -0.811* -5.959*** 
2005 2.569 3.564 19.731 2.118 3.772 23.688 0.451* -0.208 -3.957*** 
2006 2.560 4.177 20.864 2.128 4.079 25.103 0.432* 0.098 -4.239*** 
2007 2.644 5.042 22.426 2.097 4.319 26.167 0.547** 0.723** -3.741*** 
2008 2.532 6.058 23.360 2.108 5.357 28.423 0.424* 0.701** -5.063*** 
2009 2.507 4.043 22.797 2.119 4.861 25.142 0.388* -0.818** -2.345*** 
2010 2.563 3.871 21.515 2.181 4.401 22.787 0.382* -0.530* -1.272* 
2011 2.658 3.838 21.501 2.185 4.522 27.158 0.473* -0.684* -5.657*** 
2012 2.632 3.988 23.128 2.207 4.664 26.520 0.425* -0.676* -3.392*** 
2013 2.571 3.969 24.782 2.094 4.554 29.167 0.477* -0.585* -4.385*** 
          
Appendix 8 presents yearly means for firm liquidity, credit lines and long-term debt.  logLIQ is the logarithm of the liquidity 
index (the liquidity index is the sum of cash, cash equivalents, and available line of credit divided by cash volatility); loc_net 
is line of credit balance divided by net assets; and BLEV is book leverage.  *, **, and *** indicate statistically significant 
differences at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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FIGURE 1: TREND OF LIQUIDITY INDEX  
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FIGURE 2: TREND OF CREDIT LINES TO NET ASSETS
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FIGURE 3: TREND OF LONG-TERM DEBT RATIO 
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PART 3 
 
 
 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC DETERMINANTS OF SMALL FIRM LIQUIDITY AND 
THE RELATION TO FIRM PERFORMANCE 
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PART 3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Properly managing liquidity is major challenge for small businesses. According to a 
report by the Corporation for Enterprise Development, about 37.0% of experienced business 
owners have cash shortages. Furthermore, a September 2013 Forbes magazine article states that 
8 out of 10 small businesses fail
20
 for various reasons including poor liquidity. To increase their 
likelihood of survival, small business owners need to be aware the factors that influence their 
cash management behavior. 
A substantial body of literature examines the impact of liquidity management of publicly 
traded firms; however, very little research focuses on the determinants of the liquidity of small 
private firms.  Walker and Petty (1978) find small manufacturing firms with less than $5 million 
in total assets have less liquidity and working capital than large firms, but do not investigate the 
determinants of that drives that difference.   Another stream of literature focuses on how 
demographic characteristics of firm owners and managers impact firm performance. Cole (2013), 
Fairlie and Robb (2007), Robb and Robinson (2012), Robb and Watson (2012) examine how 
characteristics such as gender and race affect firm performance and capital structure. At this time 
no studies of small firms exist that relate owner characteristics and firm liquidity. Recent 
                                                          
20
 Forbes Magazine, September 12, 2013 
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studies
21
 investigate liquidity management in large private firms; however, they do not relate 
liquidity management practices to owner characteristics.   
 This study examines the determinants of liquidity for small firms and their relation to 
firm performance.  Using data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), we analyze several 
aspects of small private firm liquidity, including 1) determinants of firm liquidity, 2) trends in 
small firm liquidity over the time period 2004 – 2012, and 3) the relation between firm liquidity 
and firm performance. Determinants examined include firm characteristics such as size, 
profitability, debt levels, and expenditures, as well as, demographic variables such as gender, 
race, education, and experience of owner.   
We find that female-owned firms are more liquid than male-owned firms and white-
owned firms are less liquid than Asian- or African American-owned firms. Additionally, our 
findings indicate that firms with highly educated owners have more liquidity than firms with less 
educated owners, and firms with the least experienced owners are less liquid than firms with 
more experienced owners. We also show a negative relation between inventory levels, equipment 
holdings, and liquidity. Our findings provide insight into the determinants of small firm liquidity, 
which could benefit other small business owners struggling with liquidity issues.   
 
  
                                                          
21
 Gao, Harford, & Li  (2014), Decman & Sever (2014 ), and Mortal & Reisel (2014 ) 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Managing liquidity is an important issue to owners/managers ever since Keynes (1936) 
argued liquidity management and financial constraints are fundamentally linked. He suggested if 
financial markets were efficient then firm liquidity decisions would be irrelevant. However, 
given that financial markets contain frictions, liquidity decisions matter. Keynes’ motive for 
liquidity is precautionary, as he assumes firms are typically financially constrained.  According 
to Myers and Majluf (1984), a firm with no financial slack will bypass some positive NPV 
projects, given asymmetric information in financial markets They suggest existing investors are 
better off when firms’ have sufficient financial slack (cash and cash equivalents) to fund 
investment opportunities, since external financing is costly. In Graham and Harvey’s (2001) 
survey of CFOs, CFOs consider their decisions about corporate liquidity to be one the most 
important decisions they make. Further they view their primary job as finding ways to fund 
investment opportunities proposed by the CEO. 
The existing liquidity management literature focuses on three primary areas:  the 
determinants of cash holdings, the propensity to save cash (i.e. cash flow sensitivity of cash), and 
the value of cash.   The determinants literature includes work by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (1999), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), Subramaniam, Tang, Yue, and Zhou (2011), 
and Ang and Smedema (2011), among others.  Opler et al examine the level of cash holdings for 
a large sample of publicly-traded U.S. firms. They find firms with more growth opportunities 
and riskier cash flows maintain larger liquidity positions, while firms with better access to capital 
markets have lower liquidity positions. These findings support the Keynes’ (1936) arguments for 
 
 
97 
 
liquidity.  Additionally, Opler et al suggest firms have a target or optimal level of liquidity that 
varies with the value of the firm’s investments and the likelihood these investments cannot be 
financed with external sources.   
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) find recent increases in firm cash holdings are partially 
explained by increased cash flow volatility and increased R&D spending. These results are again 
consistent with precautionary motive for holding cash. Subramaniam, Tang, Yue, and Zhou 
(2011) show non-diversified firms tend to have larger cash balances, while Ang and Smedema 
(2011) find evidence that less financially constrained firms build their cash balance ahead of 
recessions. We explore whether small firms have similar liquidity determinants and the impact of 
owner characteristics on those determinants. 
Another area of research examines the propensity of firms to save cash from operating 
cash flows, which is referred to as the cash flow sensitivity of cash in cash management 
literature. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) find financially constrained firms have a 
higher propensity to save.  In a global study of cash flow sensitivity to cash, Kusnadi and Wei 
(2011) find financially constrained firms exhibit a higher propensity to save in countries with 
weak legal protection of investors. Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2013) examine European mergers 
and find that target firms with a higher propensity to save cash were constrained prior to being 
acquired. We believe that demographic characteristics may impact a firm’s propensity to save, 
but the Kauffman survey does not contain the accounting measures needed to analyze this area of 
liquidity management.   
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 The most recent stream of liquidity management literature focuses on the value of cash. 
Both Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2006) estimate the value of 
firm liquidity by regressing market value of firm on cash holdings. Both studies find the 
marginal value of cash is higher for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) verify these findings internationally.  Denis and 
Sibilkov (2010) find higher cash holdings are associated with greater investment for constrained 
firms and that investment is positively associated with value in constrained firms relative to 
unconstrained firms.  
 All of these studies indicate that greater corporate liquidity in financially constrained 
firms is a value-enhancing response to costly external financing. While the market value of small 
firms cannot be directly ascertained, given that most small firms would be considered financially 
constrained
22
, proper liquidity management should enhance firm value or performance. To 
evaluate the impact of liquidity on firm performance, we analyze how liquidity relates to 
profitability.   Based on the aforementioned corporate liquidity literature, we anticipate that 
liquidity will be positively related to profitability.  
  H1: Liquidity is positively related to profitability for small firms 
 
Over the years corporate governance literature has examined the impact of CEO 
characteristics, board demographics, and the characteristics of other executives on firm 
performance. A recent study even examines the effect of CEO attractiveness on shareholder 
                                                          
22
 Opler et al (1999) indicates that small firms are financially constrained 
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value and finds that higher returns are associated with more attractive CEOs (Halford and Hsu, 
2014).  A narrower stream of this literature focuses on the relation between owner characteristics 
and small firm performance. Bosma, van Praag, Thruik, and deWit (2004), Fairlie & Robb 
(2009), Fasci & Valdez (1998), Honig (1998), Loscocco (1991), Robb (2002) and Rosa, Carter, 
and Hamilton (1996) have examined gender differences in firm performance including sales, 
profits, and firm closure rates. Based on the findings in these studies, Klapper and Parker (2011) 
suggest women entrepreneurs tend to underperform their male counterparts. Robb and Watson 
(2012) counter these findings by showing many of the previous studies do not control for the size 
or scale of the firm. Using Kauffman survey data they find no difference in the performance of 
female- and male-owned new enterprises based on four year closure rates, return on assets, and 
the Sharpe ratio for small firms. Other studies find females are generally more risk averse than 
males.
23
 More risk adverse business owners would prefer to have more precautionary liquidity; 
thus higher liquidity measures.   Based on these conflicting findings, we test the null hypothesis 
that there is no relation between gender and liquidity.  
 H2: Liquidity in unrelated to gender 
 Fairlie and Robb (2007) analyze business performance based on race using confidential 
small firm data from the Characteristics of Business Owners survey. They find white-owned 
businesses significantly outperform African-American owned businesses. White-owned 
businesses have higher sales, profits, employment, and survival. They conclude the lack of prior 
work experience in a family business among African-American managers contributes to the poor 
                                                          
23
 Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Barber and Odean (2001), Kepler and Shane (2007), Watson and Newby (2005)  
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performance.  Fairlei and Robb mention the liquidity constraints that new businesses face due to 
start-up capital issues; however, they do not formally compare the liquidity of white-owned to 
African-American owned businesses.  Based on previous findings, we hypothesize the African-
American businesses will be less liquid than white owned ventures.  
  H3: Liquidity is unrelated to race 
 Bates (1990) finds college education is significantly positively related to firm survival. 
Bosma, van Praag, Thruik, and deWit (2004) find that prior industry experience improves firm 
survival, profitability, and growth. Headd (2003) hypothesizes more education and experience 
positively correlated with survival, as lessons learned often translate into competent decision 
making.  Robb and Watson (2012) do not find a significant relation between education or 
experience and firm performance for small firms. Thus we test the null hypothesis that liquidity 
is not related to education or experience. 
  H4A: Liquidity is unrelated to education of owners 
  H4B: Liquidity is unrelated to experience of owners  
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DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
  This study uses the Kauffman Firm Survey micro-firm data for the period 2004-2012. 
The Kauffman Institute collected data on almost 8,000 firms that began operations in 2004. 
Every year the Kauffman Institute surveys the same group of firms. The survey data contain 
detailed information about the firms and their owners. Firm information includes: financial 
information including cash, revenues, net income, and assets; as well as industry, number of 
employees, and the legal form of business. Owner information includes: gender, race, age, 
average hours worked per week, education, and years of previous industry experience. We 
constrain firms to report data for all years from 2004 to 2012. Our final sample includes 23,780 
firm-year observations on over 4,500 firms.  The typical firm in our sample has revenues of 
$857,630, almost $900,000 in total assets, net income of $35,333, and a little over $230,000 in 
cash.  The typical owner in our sample is a white male in his mid-30s, with less than 10 years of 
experience in the industry and some post high-school education or training. Firm characteristics 
are presented in Appendix 1.
24
   
 Equation 1 examines the relation between liquidity (cash), firm characteristics and owner 
demographics.    
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑜 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽5𝐴/𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ,                                (1)                 
                                                          
24
 Only mean values are presented in tables, as we are not allowed to present medians, minimums, and maximums 
for privacy reasons as the Kauffman foundation does not allow the reporting of any statistic that would represent a 
single firm thus violating the privacy of that firm 
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where Cashi,t is the firm’s cash scaled by total assets, net of cash (referred to as net assets). 
Revenuei,t is the firm’s revenues scaled by net assets, Net Inci,t is the firm’s net income scaled by 
net assets, Inventoryi,t is the firm’s inventories scaled by net assets, Equipi,t is the firm’s 
equipment scaled by net assets and A/Pi,t is the firm’s accounts payable scaled by net assets.  
DemoDUMi,t are various demographic indicator variables.  Male_DV is an indicator variable set 
equal to 1 if the primary owner is male.  White_DV (Black_DV) is an indicator variable set equal 
to 1 if the primary owner is white (African-American). Low_exp (High_exp) is an indicator 
variable set equal to 1 if the primary owner has less 10 years (more than 20 years) of experience 
in the industry.  Degree_DV is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the primary owner has some 
post-high school vocational training or college (AS, BS, BA), while the postDegree_DV is an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 if the primary owner has any post graduate education (MS, MA, 
MBA, JD, PhD) 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Figure 1 shows the trend of liquidity for sample firms during the period from 2004 – 
2011.  The average cash-to-net assets over the period is 0.261 with the minimum occurring in 
2008 at 0.245 and the maximum of 0.274 in 2011.  Since 2008, liquidity positions have increased 
dramatically for our sample firm, which is consistent with recent liquidity studies of publicly 
traded firms, see Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007), 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2012), and Sanchez and Yurdagul (2013), for example. 
 Appendix 2 compares the results for different genders.  Of 23,780 firm-observations, 
only 20,511 reported the gender of the primary owner/operator. Seventy-five of the firms are 
owned by men. These firms have twice as many assets, and substantially more revenues.  Also, 
male owned firms have higher wage expenses, research and development expenditures and net 
income, while female firms have higher total expenditures. Our variable of interest, Cashi,t, is not 
significantly different for female owned firms and contradicts the findings of previous studies 
that suggest women tend to be more risk averse (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998, Barber and 
Odean,2001, Kepler and Shane, 2007, and Watson and Newby, 2005) More risk averse managers 
may tend to hold higher cash balances for precautionary purposes, our univariate statistics do not 
show that female owners are more risk averse than male owners.   
Appendix 3 compares company characteristics by race. Of the 23,780 firm-observations, 
only 20,890 reported the race of the primary owner/operator. 89.7% of the firms are owned by 
whites, 6.7% by African Americans, and 3.6% by Asians, with less than 1% owned by all other 
races. 
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Asian owned firms are the largest firms with the highest values across all characteristics, 
including cash. Our variable of interest, Cashi,t, indicates that the Asian owned firms are the most 
risk averse with a mean value of 0.311 versus, 0.257 for white owned firms, and 0.280 for 
African-American owned firms.  These results do not indicate that African-American owned 
firms are significantly less liquid as previous studies imply. Our findings indicate that African 
American owners are more risk averse than white owners or more financially constrained thus 
need larger cash balances.  Since African American owned firms are significantly smaller and 
more financially constrained, we think the latter explanation is more likely.   
 Appendix 4 compares firm characteristics by owner education level. Of the 23,780 firm-
observations, only 1 report owner education levels.  Sixty-percent of the owners have post-high 
school education (Degree), with only 11% without any post-high school education or training 
(No degree), and 29% have at least some graduate education (Post Degree).   Univariate results 
indicate that firms with the most educated owners have more assets, expenses and net income; 
whereas, the firms with the least educated owners have the lowest mean values across all 
characteristics.  Our variable of interest, Cash, is slightly higher for firms with the least educated 
owners and highest for the least educated ones; however, the differences are insignificant and 
provide no meaningful insight.  
 Appendix 5 compares firm characteristics by owner experience levels. Of the 23,780 
firm-observations, only 17,194 report owner experience levels.  We divide owner experience 
levels into three categories. Owners with less than 10 years of experience in the industry are 
considered low experience owners. Owners with more than 20 years of industry experience are 
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considered high experience owners and those in between are categorized as medium experience 
workers.   The majority (45%) of the owners have less than 10 years’ experience, with 29% of 
the owners having more than 20 years of experience. Firm characteristics are more diverse based 
on experience. Firms with high experience owners are significantly larger and more liquid. High 
experience firms also appear to have more revenues, total expenses and wages. High experience 
firms have significantly less inventory and land than low experience firms and less equipment 
than medium experience firms. Our primary variable of interest, Cash, is significantly higher for 
firms with experienced owners indicating that experience increases risk aversion and reinforces 
the notion that experience enhances wisdom.   
Appendix 6 reports the multivariate results of the relation between cash, control 
variables, and demographic determinants. Liquidity is negatively related to inventory and 
equipment, but not significantly related revenues or profitability.  The insignificant relation 
between liquidity and net income is surprising and does not support our hypothesis one.  The 
demographic determinants that influence firm liquidity are gender and education. The 
multivariate results confirm our univariate results that female-owned firms hold more cash than 
male-owned firms suggesting that women are more risk averse and providing support for second 
hypothesis. Additionally, the education dummy variables indicate the firms of the least educated 
owners are less liquid, while the firms with the most educated owners are more liquid.  While the 
results in Appendix 6 do not confirm our univariate results for race and experience, they do not 
invalidate them either by indicating an opposite relation exists.   
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CONCLUSION 
We examine the determinants of liquidity for over 2,600 micro-firms surveyed by the 
Kauffman Foundation over the period 2004 – 2012. Univariate results indicate liquidity is related 
to the gender, race, education and experience level of the primary firm owner. Female owned 
firms are more liquid than male-owned firms, White owned firms are less liquid than Asian- or 
African American-owned firms, firms with highly educated owners have more liquidity than 
firms with less educated owners, and firms with the least experienced owners are less liquid than 
firms with more experienced owners.  Multivariate models that control for firm size, 
profitability, and debt level show significant relations between firm liquidity, owner gender, and 
owner education that confirm univariate results.     
Small firms are vital to the U.S. economy. They create jobs, innovate, and help maintain 
a competitive market economy.  The Kauffman survey data provides a plethora of information 
for analyzing the characteristics of small firms and we intend to continue our investigation of 
small firms, their characteristics, and hopefully increase the likelihood of small firm survival by 
helping owners and managers make more informed decisions. 
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APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
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 Mean Std error   
Firm Characteristics 
Cash_net 0.26 0.312   
Revenue_net 62.54 6,708.53   
Total Exp_net 23.14 1,075.63   
Wages_net 70.95 9,573.72   
Net Inc_net -4.43 707.16   
Equip_net 0.26 0.305   
Inventory_net 0.13 0.247   
Land_net 0.74 0.228   
A/P_net 1.92 124.99   
R&D Exp_net 1.22 105.01   
Cash $230,000    
Revenues $857,630    
Total Assets $893,927 $1,700,000   
Net Income $35,333    
     
Owner Demographics 
Gender 75% Male 25% Female   
Race 90% White 6.7% African-American 3.6% Asian  
Education 14.4% No degree 82% degree 3.7% Post degree  
Experience 26% High 45% Low 29% Medium  
Appendix 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. Cash_net is f29_assetval_cash scaled by 
net assets, where net assets is the sum of f29_assetval_acctrec, f29_assetval_inventory, 
f29_assetval_equip, f29_assetval_landbuild, f29_assetval_veh, f29_othbusprop, and 
f29_assetval_other; Revenue_net  is f16a_rev_amt scaled by net assets; Total Exp_net is 
f17a_tot_exp_amt scaled by net assets; Wages_net  is f18a_wage_exp_amt scaled by net assets; Net 
Inc_net  is f24_profitloss_amt scaled by net assets; Equip_net is f29_assetval_equip scaled by net 
assets; Inventory_net is f29_assetval_inv scaled by net assets; Land_net is f29_assetval_landbuild 
scaled by net assets; A/P is f31_value_acctpay scaled by net assets; R&D Exp is f19a_res_dev_amt 
scaled by net assets; Cash is f29_assetval_cash; Revenue  is f16a_rev_amt; Total Assets is the sum of  
f29_assetval_cash, f29_assetval_acctrec, f29_assetval_inventory, f29_assetval_equip, 
f29_assetval_landbuild, f29_assetval_veh, f29_othbusprop, and f29_assetval_other; Net Inc is 
f24_profitloss_amt 
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APPENDIX 2: UNIVARATE STATISTICS BY GENDER 
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 Male Female Male-Female 
 Mean Mean Diff t-stat 
Cash 0.259 0.260 0.001 0.192 
 (0.002) (0.004)   
Total Assets 1,004,088 407,733 596,355** 2.385 
 (142,209) (85,436)   
Revenue 81.678 9.607 72.071 0.683 
 (60.856) (1.897)   
Total Exp 28.877 7.559 -21.318 1.260 
 (11.536) (34.158)   
Wages 96.174 2.139 94.035 0.624 
 (86.852) (0.724)   
Net Inc -4.408 -5.251 0.833 0.075 
 (6.179) (5.176)   
Equip 0.262 0.256 0.006 1.217 
 (0.002) (0.004)   
Inventory 0.115 0.178 -0.063*** 16.546 
 (0.002) (0.004)   
Land 0.074 0.077 -0.002 0.683 
 (0.002) (0.004)   
A/P 1.850 2.265 0.416 0.211 
 (1.007) (1.569)   
R&D Exp 1.636 0.139 1.497 0.624 
 (1.368) (0.069)   
Observations 16,599 
75% 
5,520 
25% 
 
Appendix 2 reports the univariate statistics for male and female owned firms.  
Cash is f29_assetval_cash scaled by net assets, where net assets is the sum of 
f29_assetval_acctrec, f29_assetval_inventory, f29_assetval_equip, 
f29_assetval_landbuild, f29_assetval_veh, f29_othbusprop, and 
f29_assetval_other; Revenue is f16a_rev_amt scaled by net assets; Total Exp 
is f17a_tot_exp_amt scaled by net assets; Wages is f18a_wage_exp_amt 
scaled by net assets; Net Inc is f24_profitloss_amt scaled by net assets; Equip 
is f29_assetval_equip scaled by net assets; Inventory is f29_assetval_inv 
scaled by net assets; Land is f29_assetval_landbuild scaled by net assets; A/P 
is f31_value_acctpay scaled by net assets; and R&D Exp is f19a_res_dev_amt 
scaled by net assets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 3: UNIVARIATE STATISTICS BY RACE 
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 White-owned Black-owned Asian-owned White-Black White-Asian 
 Mean Mean Mean Diff t-stat Diff t-stat 
Cash 0.257 0.280 0.311 -0.022*** -2.592 -0.053*** -4.651 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.012)     
Total Assets 880,046 188,466 2,608,129 691,580* 1.752 -1,728,082*** -2.717 
 (114,180) (35,018) (1,471,623)     
Revenue 19.986 7.326 1,319.065 12.660 0.453 -1,299.079*** -4.870 
 (7.639) (1.168) (1,307.183)     
Total Exp 23.316 5.405 86.855 17.911 0.610 -63.539* -1.485 
 (80.33) (0.805) (78.467)     
Wages 82.731 2.034 67.496 80.697 0.287 15.235 0.040 
 (76.953) (0.629) (65.359)     
Net Inc -6.113 -0.771 19.962 -5.341 -0.260 -26.075 -0.927 
 (5.629) (0.464) (19.621)     
Equip 0.260 0.267 0.215 -0.007 -0.834 0.045*** 4.103 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.011)     
Inventory 0.131 0.121 0.143 0.010* 1.429 -0.012* -1.372 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.009)     
Land 0.077 0.064 0.076 0.013** 1.973 0.001 0.087 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.009)     
A/P 2.061 2.523 0.206 -0.462 -0.126 1.855 0.376 
 (0.997) (1.691) (0.036)     
R&D Exp 1.433 0.338 0.165 1.095 0.241 1.268 0.210 
 (1.210) (0.276) (0.036)     
Observations 
18,723 
90% 
1,402 
6.7% 
765 
3.6% 
    
Appendix 3 reports univariate statistics white- and African American- and Asian-owned firms. Cash is f29_assetval_cash 
scaled by net assets, where net assets is the sum of f29_assetval_acctrec, f29_assetval_inventory, f29_assetval_equip, 
f29_assetval_landbuild, f29_assetval_veh, f29_othbusprop, and f29_assetval_other; Revenue is f16a_rev_amt scaled by 
net assets; Total Exp is f17a_tot_exp_amt scaled by net assets; Wages is f18a_wage_exp_amt scaled by net assets; Net 
Inc is f24_profitloss_amt scaled by net assets; Equip is f29_assetval_equip scaled by net assets; Inventory is 
f29_assetval_inv scaled by net assets; A/P is f31_value_acctpay scaled by net assets; and R&D Exp is f19a_res_dev_amt 
scaled by net assets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, 
and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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 No Degree Degree Post Degree No Degree-Degree Degree-Post 
 Mean Mean Mean Diff t-stat Diff t-stat 
Cash 0.891 0.824 .706 0.066 0.330 0.124 0.365 
 (0.264) 0.070 0.706     
Total Assets 38,242 609,680 1,939,161 -227,258 -1.039 -1,390,576*** -3.266 
 148,531 87,308 811,169     
Revenue 11.659 16.726 24.066 -5.066 -0.656 -7.685 -0.496 
 2.737 3.205 6.867     
Total Exp 12.545 28.359 9.802 -15.814 -0.437 19.428 0.265 
 5.065 15.154 1.981     
Wages 1.383 5.360 2.000 -3.977 -0.841 3.517 0.367 
 0.241 1.985 0.338     
Net Inc 0.830 3.754 3.481 -2.924 -0.592 0.286 0.029 
 0.381 2.072 3.070     
Equip 0.363 0.364 0.344 -0.001 -0.112 0.021* 1.307 
 0.008 0.003 0.015     
Inventory 0.194 0.175 0.231 0.019*** 2.715 -0.060*** -4.589 
 0.007 0.003 0.014     
Land 0.103 0.089 0.068 0.014*** 2.472 0.022** 1.987 
 0.006 0.002      
A/P 0.388 3.579 0.650 -3.191 -0.618 3.067 0.293 
 0.146 2.167 0.197     
R&D Exp 0.030 0.122 0.229 -0.092 -1.057 -0.115 -0.882 
 0.011 0.035 0.142     
Observations 
2,084 
14.4% 
11,823 
82% 
530 
3.7% 
    
Appendix 4 reports univariate statistics by owner education levels. No degree owners only have a high school 
diploma (or below); Degree owners have some college or training up to a bachelor’s degree; Post degree 
owners have education or training beyond a bachelor’s degree;  Cash is f29_assetval_cash scaled by net assets, 
where net assets is the sum of f29_assetval_acctrec, f29_assetval_inventory, f29_assetval_equip, 
f29_assetval_landbuild, f29_assetval_veh, f29_othbusprop, and f29_assetval_other; Revenue is f16a_rev_amt 
scaled by net assets; Total Exp is f17a_tot_exp_amt scaled by net assets; Wages is f18a_wage_exp_amt scaled 
by net assets; Net Inc is f24_profitloss_amt scaled by net assets; Equip is f29_assetval_equip scaled by net 
assets; Inventory is f29_assetval_inv scaled by net assets; A/P is f31_value_acctpay scaled by net assets; and 
R&D Exp is f19a_res_dev_amt scaled by net assets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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 High Exp Medium Exp Low Exp High-Low High-Medium 
 Mean Mean Mean Diff t-stat Diff t-stat 
Cash 1.201 0.865 0.967 0.234 1.037 0.336** 1.795 
 (0.183) (0.069) (0.135)     
Total Assets 1,108,003 519,911 391,963 716,040*** 3.626 588,092*** 2.277 
 (233,221) (127,423) (66,198)     
Revenue 61.345 12.118 19.173 42.172 1.210 49.228 1.156 
 (45.185) (1.276) (4.853)     
Total Exp 55.631 11.732 39.080 16.552 0.402 43.900* 1.275 
 (36.438) (2.409) (23.142)     
Wages 14.275 3.232 6.482 7.793 0.784 11.043 0.971 
 (12.037) (0.821) (2.984)     
Net Inc -5.662 1.257 5.106 -10.768 -1.060 -6.919 -0.601 
 (12.213) (0.257) (3.171)     
Equip 0.357 0.370 0.355 0.002 0.3212 -0.013** -1.785 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)     
Inventory 0.135 0.135 0.213 -0.078*** 13.711 -0.000 -0.068 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)     
Land 0.076 0.074 0.102 -0.026*** -5.344 0.003 0.551 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)     
A/P 4.323 0.546 3.535 0.788 0.172 3.776 1.182 
 (3.386) (0.135) (2.888)     
R&D Exp 7.451 0.530 0.073 7.378* 1.2757 6.921 0.985 
 (7.253) (0.294) (0.012)     
Observations 4,447 
26% 
5,008 
45% 
7,739 
29% 
    
Appendix 5 reports the univariate statistics by owner experience level. Low experience indicates the primary owner has 
less than 10 years of experience; medium experience indicates the primary owner has 10 – 20 years of experience; high 
experience indicates the primary owner has more than 20 years of experience; Cash is f29_assetval_cash scaled by net 
assets, where net assets is the sum of f29_assetval_acctrec, f29_assetval_inventory, f29_assetval_equip, 
f29_assetval_landbuild, f29_assetval_veh, f29_othbusprop, and f29_assetval_other; Revenue is f16a_rev_amt scaled by 
net assets; Total Exp is f17a_tot_exp_amt scaled by net assets; Wages is f18a_wage_exp_amt scaled by net assets; Net 
Inc is f24_profitloss_amt scaled by net assets; Equip is f29_assetval_equip scaled by net assets; Inventory is 
f29_assetval_inv scaled by net assets;  A/P is f31_value_acctpay scaled by net assets; and R&D Exp is f19a_res_dev_amt 
scaled by net assets.. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, 
and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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Independent Variables 
1 
(Cash) 
2 
(Cash) 
3 
(Cash) 
Revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.784) (0.501) (0.388) 
Net Inc 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.140) (0.384) (0.400) 
Inventory -0.433*** -0.433*** -0.434*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equip -0.447*** -0.447*** -0.450*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
A/P -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.279) (0.273) 
Male_dv -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
White_dv -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.170) (0.158) (0.194) 
Black_dv -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.783) (0.783) (0.805) 
No_degree -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post_degree 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Owner_experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.039) (0.419) (0.352) 
Constant 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.469*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm-year Observations 22,119 22,119 22,119 
R-squared 0.239 0.239 0.241 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No Yes 
Robust Std errors No Yes Yes 
Appendix 6 reports the fixed effect regressions estimating the relation between net cash and firm 
characteristics for a sample of KFS firms. Cash is f29_assetval_cash scaled by net assets, where 
net assets is the sum of f29_assetval_acctrec, f29_assetval_inventory, f29_assetval_equip, 
f29_assetval_landbuild, f29_assetval_veh, f29_othbusprop, and f29_assetval_other; Revenue is 
f16a_rev_amt scaled by net assets; Net Inc is f24_profitloss_amt scaled by net assets; Equip is 
f29_assetval_equip scaled by net assets; Inventory is f29_assetval_inv scaled by net assets; A/P 
is f31_value_acctpay scaled by net assets. Male_DV is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the 
primary owner is male. White_DV is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the primary owner is 
white; Black_DV is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the primary owner is black. No_degree is 
an indicatory equal to 1 if the primary owner has no post high-school education; Post_degree is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the primary owner has education beyond a bachelor’s degree. 
Owner_Experience is the years of experience of the primary owner.  For brevity, the annual time 
dummies and industry dummies are not presented.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1%, levels, respectively. 
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